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Abstract 
A lingering issue in class action law concerns the case or controversy 
requirement of Article III, otherwise known as the requirement of 
justiciability. For purposes of justiciability doctrines such as standing, 
mootness, and ripeness, is the class action brought by all class members, 
some class members, or just the class representative? 
This Article argues that the answer should be none of the above—it 
should be the class attorney. This Article first shows that the function of 
the class action is to assign dispositive control of, and a partial beneficial 
interest in, the class members’ claims to the class attorney. Put another 
way, the class action functionally creates a trust, with the class attorney as 
trustee of the claims for the benefit of the class. This Article argues that the 
creation of such a trust is essential for the categories of litigation in which 
class actions are permitted. But, in doing so, the class action also makes the 
class attorney the de facto real party in interest.  
This Article then shows that the current law of justiciability provides 
some support for viewing the class attorney as the relevant party for Article 
III purposes. It shows, in particular, that current law permits a court to 
recognize the standing of a noninjured party like the class attorney when, 
as in all class action settings, such recognition is necessary to adequately 
protect the interests of those injured.  
This Article concludes by exploring what lessons the trust function of 
the class action can provide for the law of justiciability. One central lesson 
of the trust function of the class action is that those who are initially 
assigned the right to bring a lawsuit, such as those who are personally 
injured, are not always adequate representatives of their own interests, let 
                                                                                                                     
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Email: 
scampos@law.miami.edu. Phone: (305) 284-5899. I am grateful for comments I received at the 
Fifth Annual Junior Faculty Federal Courts Workshop, the New Voices in Civil Justice Workshop 
at Vanderbilt, and workshops in Miami and Houston. I especially want to thank Robin Effron, Brian 
Fitzpatrick, Michael Froomkin, John Goldberg, James Grimmelmann, Dennis Lynch, Linda 
Mullenix, Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Amanda Rose, David Rosenberg, Suzanna Sherry, Rob Sitkoff, 
Henry Smith, and Kevin Stack for their helpful comments. Ali Levenson, Megan Ralstin, Sara 
Solano, and Bridget Schultz provided excellent research assistance. All errors are mine. 
1
Campos: Class Actions and Justiciability
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
554 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
alone others. This Article uses this lesson to address the adequacy of 
representation concerns that underlie the law of justiciability. This Article 
ultimately argues that the law’s insistence on a personal injury to satisfy 
justiciability requirements like standing is misplaced. Federal courts 
instead should focus on ensuring the adequate representation of all the 
interests affected by their exercise of jurisdiction. 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 554 
 
 I. THE FUNCTION OF THE CLASS ACTION ................................... 560 
  A. Joinder v. Representative View of the  
   Class Action .................................................................... 561 
  B. The Trust View of the Class Action ................................ 565 
  C. The Class Action Categories .......................................... 574 
  D. Trust v. Agency ............................................................... 577 
 
 II. THE CLASS ACTION AND THE LAW OF JUSTICIABILITY ............ 581 
  A. Class Actions and Article III .......................................... 581 
  B. Cognizable Injury and Injury In Fact ............................. 586 
  C. Cognizable Injury and the Right to Bring Suit ............... 590 
  D. “Hohfeldian” and “Non-Hohfeldian”  
   Plaintiffs ......................................................................... 597 
 
 III. THE FUNCTION OF THE LAW OF JUSTICIABILITY ...................... 598 
  A. Adequacy of Representation ........................................... 599 
  B. Incentives to Litigate ...................................................... 605 
  C. Separation of Powers ..................................................... 611 
1. United States v. Windsor ............................................ 616 
2. Hollingsworth v. Perry ............................................... 618 
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 621 
INTRODUCTION 
Perhaps the real crime was that Milberg Weiss1 was too blatant about it. 
On May 18, 2006, federal prosecutors indicted the law firm for allegedly 
paying “kickbacks” to “Paid Plaintiffs” to serve as representative parties in 
securities class actions filed by the firm.2 Milberg Weiss used the alleged 
kickbacks to gain dispositive control over all of the plaintiffs’ claims 
through the class action, including the right to settle the claims without the 
                                                                                                                     
 1. The firm’s full name was Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP. See infra note 2. 
 2. First Superseding Indictment at 10–14, United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & 
Schulman LLP, No. 05-587 (C.D. Cal. May 2006) [hereinafter Milberg Indictment]; see also Julie 
Creswell, Milberg Weiss Is Charged with Bribery and Fraud, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/18/us/18cnd-legal.html.  
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consent of all of the plaintiffs.3 The firm did so because class action 
attorneys typically get a percentage of any net recovery.4 Before the 
indictment, Milberg Weiss had amassed a fortune by filing class actions on 
behalf of plaintiffs who probably had no idea that they were being 
represented by the firm.5 
The irony of Milberg Weiss’s legal troubles is that it is well known that 
“[c]lass actions almost invariably come into being through the actions of 
lawyers—in effect, it is the agents who create the principals.”6 Scholars, 
practitioners, and courts all recognize that, in almost all cases, the class 
attorney files the class action as an investment, with virtually no input from 
the class members the class attorney purportedly represents. Although 
scholars have criticized this feature of the class action,7 the reality is that 
the class attorney has no clients. 
This Article uses the reality of class action practice to address a 
lingering issue in class action law. The issue concerns the law of 
justiciability under Article III of the Constitution, which includes doctrines 
such as standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine.8 
For example, a party must have sufficient Article III standing to assert a 
                                                                                                                     
 3. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing procedures for attorneys concerning the “settlement, 
voluntary dismissal, or compromise” of a class action, but not requiring the consent of all class 
members). 
 4. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.13 cmt. b (2010) [hereinafter ALI, 
PRINCIPLES] (noting the preference for “the percentage method” among courts); see also Milberg 
Indictment, supra note 2, at 27. 
 5. See Lonny Hoffman & Alan F. Steinberg, The Ongoing Milberg Weiss Controversy, 30 
REV. LITIG. 183, 184 (2011) (noting that “Milberg was . . . the top securities class action law firm in 
the country”). 
 6. Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. 
CT. REV. 337, 341. 
 7. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 903, 904–05; John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1419, 1419–20 (2003); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers 
Without Clients or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 132–33 (2001); Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving 
Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 413, 435 (1999) (“Indeed, in some extreme instances, the parties-plaintiff appears to be 
almost superfluous or an afterthought: A necessary cipher for the attorneys to develop the litigation 
and subsequently structure a negotiated settlement of aggregated claims. The concept of the party-
plaintiff has been diluted, and this in turn contributes to the idea that the attorneys in these 
litigations essentially are free agents who identify the problem, broker and draft the legislative 
compromise, and then seek ratification of the court.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and 
Allocation After Amchem Products—Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their 
Clients’ Money, 84 VA. L. REV. 1541, 1549–50 (1998); cf. Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. 
Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 313 (2011) (arguing against advance 
consent to settle a claim in aggregate settlements because “[w]hether to develop or use that claim at 
all is, of course, the individual’s choice”). 
 8. See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 49–248 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] (defining 
“justiciability”). 
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justiciable claim in federal court.9 A party has standing if she has suffered 
“a personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful 
conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”10  
The Supreme Court has imposed this “personal injury” requirement of 
standing in part to ensure that “concrete adverseness which sharpens the 
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for 
illumination.”11 Conversely, federal courts bar lawsuits brought by a 
citizen with only a “generalized grievance” that is “plainly undifferentiated 
and ‘common to all members of the public.’”12 Such a “non-Hohfeldian” 
party has too small a stake to adequately represent the interests of those not 
before the court.13 Moreover, permitting such a party to sue would allow 
her to use the court to interfere with the discretion of the Executive Branch 
to enforce the law.14  
Federal courts have long struggled with the law of justiciability. 
Recently, the Court decided a number of cases that raised thorny 
justiciability issues.15 But federal courts have been particularly puzzled 
over what showing satisfies Article III’s justiciability requirements in a 
class action.  
                                                                                                                     
 9. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 536 (2007) (“Standing to sue is part of the common 
understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.” (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998))). 
 10. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 
U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 11. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 204 (1962)); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 87 & 
n.86 (2007) (noting that “courts have frequently concluded” this and noting that “[c]ases using this 
quotation to support the ‘litigation-enhancing’ theory of justiciability are legion”). 
 12.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992) (quoting United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171, 176–77 (1974)). 
 13. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or 
Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1033, 1036–37 (1968) (defining a “non-Hohfeldian” 
plaintiff as one who only seeks “to vindicate the interest of the fungible citizen in the enforcement 
of the law,” and noting that such plaintiffs are generally not permitted to bring suit because “unless 
the plaintiff is a person whose legal position will be affected by the court’s judgment, he cannot be 
relied on to present a serious, thorough, and complete argument”); see also Lea Brilmayer, The 
Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the “Case or Controversy” Requirement, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 297, 297–99 (1979). 
 14.  See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576–77 (noting that recognizing standing for generalized harm “is 
to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important 
constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 3)); cf. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) (noting that separation of powers concerns 
“counsel[] against recognizing standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations 
whose violation works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of the apparatus established by the 
Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties” (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3)). 
 15. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684–87; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 
(2013); Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1528–29 (2013); Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142–43 (2013); Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017 (2013); 
Already, 133 S. Ct. at 725–27. 
4
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/1
2014] CLASS ACTIONS AND JUSTICIABILITY 557 
 
For example, this past term, in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 
the Supreme Court addressed whether a “collective action” brought 
pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) was moot because the 
representative—and only—plaintiff received, but rejected, a settlement 
offer that would have satisfied her entire claim.16 In affirming the case as 
moot, the majority in Symczyk distinguished the case from class actions 
certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.17 The Court noted that 
in FLSA collective actions, the employees only “become parties . . . by 
filing written consent with the court.”18 In contrast, upon certification of a 
Rule 23 class action, “the class of unnamed persons described in the 
certification acquire[s] a legal status separate from the interest asserted by 
[the named plaintiff].”19 
The new “legal status” created by class certification can be understood 
as a conclusion by a federal court that each class member is a party before 
the court,20 and thus all class members must satisfy all Article III 
justiciability requirements. After all, at least one Justice has stated that 
“Art[icle] III contains no exception for class actions.”21 But the Court has 
also suggested that Article III standing is satisfied if only some class 
members have standing.22 In fact, there is some support for the view that 
the justiciability requirements of Article III could be satisfied by a mere 
showing that the class representative satisfied the requirements.23 
                                                                                                                     
 16. 133 S. Ct. at 1527.  
 17. Id. at 1530. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975)). 
 20. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 415 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“In 
Sosna, the Court simply acknowledged that actual class certification gives legal recognition to 
additional adverse parties.”). 
 21. Id. at 413; see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) 
(Powell, J.) (“[A] class action . . . adds nothing to the question of standing . . . .”). 
 22. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 755–57 (1976) (noting that if a 
class representative’s claim is moot, then the class action is not moot as long as other class members 
have standing); cf. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251, 260 (2003) (concluding that the named 
representatives in a class action had standing to challenge the use of race in undergraduate 
universitys transfer and admission policies even though the admission policies no longer applied to 
them). 
 23. E.g., Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336, 340 (1980) (holding that a 
class representative of an uncertified class action has standing to appeal the denial of class 
certification given the representative’s interest in the cost sharing provided by the class action); see 
also Diane Wood Hutchinson, Class Actions: Joinder or Representational Device?, 1983 SUP. CT. 
REV. 459, 497–99 (arguing in favor of a representative view of the class action in which only the 
class representative is required to satisfy the requirements of justiciability); cf. ALI, PRINCIPLES, 
supra note 4, § 1.01 cmt. c (“Absent class members are represented nonparties, not parties properly 
so-called.” (citing Hutchinson, supra, at 497–99)). The Supreme Court has acknowledged, but has 
not decided, the issue of whether a class action with uninjured plaintiffs can be brought if the class 
representatives have standing. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 831 (1999) 
(acknowledging, but not deciding, the issue of whether exposure-only claimants have standing to 
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This Article first argues that courts and scholars are focusing on the 
wrong parties.24 Instead, this Article argues that the class attorney, rather 
than any of the members of the class, is the real party in interest for 
purposes of the law of justiciability. This is because the function of the 
class action is to create a trust in which dispositive control of the class 
members’ claims is assigned to the class attorney for the benefit of the 
class.25 The trust function of the class action is essential in contexts where 
the class action has been permitted because the class members cannot 
adequately protect their own interests.26 Consequently, this Article argues 
that the justiciability doctrines should reflect a reality that everyone 
recognizes—the class attorney is the only relevant party. 
This Article further shows that the trust function is consistent with 
much of the existing law of justiciability.27 Admittedly, under a trust view 
of the class action, the class attorney’s only interest in the action is the 
attorney’s fees provided by the litigation. As noted in Symczyk, recent 
precedent has held that “[an] interest in attorney’s fees is . . . insufficient to 
create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of 
the underlying claim.”28 However, as discussed below, there is substantial 
precedent that permits nonparties to bring a justiciable action in federal 
court when it is necessary to adequately protect the interests of the injured 
parties.29 This precedent supports the trust view of the class action because 
the de facto trust created by the class action is designed precisely “to 
provide means of vindicating the rights of groups of people who 
individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents 
into court at all.”30 
This Article concludes by examining what lessons the trust function of 
the class action can provide for the law of justiciability. Other scholars 
have recognized the parallels between the class action and Article III’s 
                                                                                                                     
sue in a class action with injured representatives); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 
612 (1997) (same). 
 24. See infra Part I. 
 25. I have discussed the trust function of the class action in prior articles. See Sergio J. 
Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1077–79 (2012) [hereinafter 
Campos, Mass Torts]; Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 751, 
772, 775–77 (2012) [hereinafter Campos, Proof]. Unlike my prior articles, this Article discusses in 
much greater detail the trust function’s implications for the justiciability requirements of Article III. 
I plan a thoroughgoing trust model of the class action in a future article, which applies the model to 
other issues in class action law. See Sergio J. Campos, A Trust Model of the Class Action 
(unpublished draft) (on file with author) [hereinafter Campos, Trust]. 
 26. See infra Sections I.B–C. 
 27. See infra Part II. 
 28. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1532 n.5 (2013) (quoting Lewis 
v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990)). 
 29. See infra Sections II.B–D. 
 30. See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969). 
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limitations on justiciability.31 Scholars have noted that both share a 
concern with whether the parties before the court will adequately represent 
the interests of nonparties who will be affected by the court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction.32 
The adequacy of representation of the interests of those affected by an 
action also underlies the Court’s separation of powers concerns in the 
justiciability context. As argued below, these separation of powers 
concerns can be understood as a concern with the appropriateness of 
judicial intervention given other political alternatives to protect the 
interests of those affected. This explains why federal courts prohibit parties 
from bringing suit solely to enforce the law. Permitting such a suit 
generally would interfere with the properly elected law enforcement 
representatives of the people.33  
However, while some scholars (although rarely and obliquely) have 
recognized the trust function of the class action,34 none have examined 
whether this function suggests any reforms for the law of justiciability. One 
central lesson of the trust view of the class action is that those actually 
injured cannot always adequately represent their own interests in court. 
Accordingly, the trust function of the class action strongly suggests that 
                                                                                                                     
 31. E.g., Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 306; Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing is Good For, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1724 (2007) (“Standing determinations involve some of the same 
considerations as class certification.”); Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A 
Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 675 (1973). 
 32.  E.g., Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 309–10. 
 33. See infra Sections III.A & C. 
 34. The only other scholars to suggest a trust view of the class action are Martin Redish and 
Megan Kiernan, but they do not believe that the class action attorney can be seen as the real party in 
interest for Article III purposes. See Martin H. Redish & Megan B. Kiernan, Avoiding Death by a 
Thousand Cuts: The Relitigation of Class Certification and the Realities of the Modern Class 
Action 4, 21–22 (Aug. 8, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2307683 (noting that class attorneys “act as a quasi-guardian or trustee on 
behalf of the absent class members,” but noting that “[o]f course, we do not mean to suggest that 
class attorneys should be deemed the real parties in interest in a purely formalistic sense; they could 
not, for example, assert Article III standing since they do not possess the substantive right being 
asserted”). Other scholars have only suggested, without stating explicitly, the trust view of the class 
action. E.g., David Rosenberg, Response, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for 
Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 859 (2002) (noting that a mandatory class action is 
superior to voluntary aggregation among plaintiffs’ firms because it is “unlikely that a single 
organization (or otherwise optimally assembled group of lawyers) would acquire beneficial interest 
in all classable claims,” which suggests that the class attorney is the trustee of the plaintiffs’ claims 
with a “beneficial interest” in the recovery); Stephen Berry, Ending Substance’s Indenture to 
Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 299, 308 (1980) (“In most small-claim class damage actions, where no single class member or 
named plaintiff stands to realize any significant economic gain, plaintiff’s counsel, as the one with 
the largest stake in the outcome, is in reality the class representative.”); cf. Hutchinson, supra note 
23, at 487 (recognizing that the class attorney could be considered the real party in interest, but only 
if “one is willing to look beyond the person who is technically a party of record to his attorney”). 
7
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federal courts should not use a showing of a “concrete and particularized” 
injury that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual way” as a 
proxy for adequacy of representation.35 In fact, there is an inherent 
divergence between the private interests of those personally injured and the 
interests of all those in society affected by the lawsuit.36 This is especially 
true in constitutional litigation, where a constitutional interpretation can 
impact a significant number of individuals not before the court. 
This lesson also applies in cases where the Supreme Court has 
expressed separation of powers concerns. In such cases the Court has been 
concerned with judicial intervention interfering with the elected 
representatives of the people. But, again, the class action teaches us that 
not all individuals initially assigned to represent the interests of others will 
adequately do so, even when elected. 
Instead, federal courts should focus on whether the incentives of the 
parties in any particular case diverge from the social interest in initiating, 
developing, and adjudicating the case. The trust function of the class action 
further suggests that federal courts should permit nonparties to file suit 
when it is necessary to adequately protect the interests of injured 
individuals who cannot protect themselves. This Article concludes by 
using this insight to analyze the justiciability issues decided by the Court 
this term in litigation involving California’s Proposition 837 and the 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).38 
I.  THE FUNCTION OF THE CLASS ACTION 
As background, class actions in federal courts are governed by Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which provides that “[o]ne or more members 
of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all 
[class] members” if certain requirements are met.39 A party seeking class 
certification must first show that (1) the class is “numerous” (the 
numerosity requirement); (2) “there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class” (the commonality requirement); (3) the representative party’s 
claims and defenses are “typical” of the class (the typicality requirement); 
and (4) “the representative part[y] will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class” (the adequacy of representation requirement).40 
Second, the party “must satisfy at least one of the three requirements listed 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992). 
 36. See Steven Shavell, The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly 
Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 339 (1982) (arguing that the private incentive to bring a 
lawsuit and the social interest in bringing the lawsuit diverge). 
 37. See infra Subsection III.C.2. 
 38. See infra Subsection III.C.1. 
 39. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
 40. Id. 
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in Rule 23(b).”41 The Rule 23(b) requirements define three different 
categories of actions in which the certification of a class action is 
appropriate. 
A.  Joinder v. Representative View of the Class Action 
As Judge Diane Wood identified in a seminal article, the history of 
class actions in federal courts supports two competing conceptions of the 
relevant parties for Article III purposes.42 The first is the “joinder” view of 
the class action, under which “[e]very member of a class . . . must 
independently satisfy all procedural requirements for appearing before the 
court in question.”43 Both the “all class members” and “some class 
members” view of class action standing discussed above represent different 
flavors of the joinder view. 
The second is the “representative” view of the class action.44 Under the 
representative view, once the class representative “has established his right 
to come before the court, he may act as legal representative for others 
similarly situated, whether or not they could have sued independently.”45 
The best support for the “joinder” view of the class action appears in 
decisions concerning the mootness of the class representative’s claim. As 
discussed earlier, in Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, the Supreme 
Court addressed whether a FLSA collective action was moot because the 
lone plaintiff had received a settlement offer that would have satisfied her 
claim.46 There, the plaintiff had conceded that her claim was moot, and no 
other plaintiff opted into the action, as required under the 
                                                                                                                     
 41. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(1)–(3). 
 42. Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 459–60 (identifying these two conceptions of the class 
action). These two conceptions were also identified in an earlier survey of class action law. See 
Developments in the Law: Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1466 (1976) [hereinafter 
Developments] (describing these two conceptions). 
 43. Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 459. Admittedly, the term “joinder” is inherently 
ambiguous and obscures the more specific functions of the procedures the term describes. See 
generally Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759 (2012). This Article 
uses the term “joinder” in the sense used by Judge Wood to mean a procedure that “joins” 
additional parties to an action but does not change each party’s pre-existing requirement to satisfy 
Article III. 
 44. Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 460. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1532 (2013); see also supra text accompanying notes 16–19. In 
Symczyk, the offer was made pursuant to Rule 68, which allows a defendant to make an offer of 
judgment prior to trial, and, if rejected, and “[i]f the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not 
more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was 
made.” FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d). 
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FLSA.47Accordingly, the Court concluded that the action was moot 
because the plaintiff’s mooted claim was the only one before the Court.48 
In deciding Symczyk, the majority distinguished prior precedent 
discussing the mootness of the class representative’s claim in class actions 
certified under Rule 23.49 The majority noted that once a class action is 
certified under Rule 23, “the class of unnamed persons described in the 
certification acquire[s] a legal status separate from the interest asserted by 
[the named plaintiff].”50 This new “legal status” can be understood as a 
conclusion by a district court that each plaintiff is a party before it.51 Thus, 
each plaintiff not only can be a substitute class representative, but each 
must satisfy the requirements of Article III.52 
The Court has also suggested a joinder view of the class action outside 
the context of Article III. In Zahn v. International Paper Co.,53 for 
example, the Court addressed whether the statutory amount in controversy 
requirements for diversity jurisdiction must be satisfied by all class 
members or just the class representative.54 The Court held that the amount 
in controversy requirement must be satisfied by each class member,55 
which strongly suggests that each class member must satisfy all other 
jurisdictional requirements, including the justiciability requirements of 
Article III. 
Moreover, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate 
Insurance Co., the Court examined whether a New York state law 
prohibiting class actions seeking statutory damages under state law 
prevented a federal court from certifying the same class under Rule 23.56 In 
                                                                                                                     
 47. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1529; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012) (permitting “collective 
actions” in which the plaintiff asserts the claims of herself and all “other employees similarly 
situated,” but further providing that “[n]o employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action 
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court 
in which such action is brought”). 
 48. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1529. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 1530 (alterations in original) (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975)). 
 51. See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 415 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(noting that, in Sosna, “the Court simply acknowledged that actual class certification gives legal 
recognition to additional adverse parties”). 
 52. Id. at 413 (“Art[icle] III contains no exception for class actions.”); see also Simon v. E. 
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (Powell, J.) (“[A] class action . . . adds 
nothing to the question of standing.”). 
 53. 414 U.S. 291 (1973). 
 54. Id. at 292 (“The claim of each of the named plaintiffs was found to satisfy the $10,000 
jurisdictional amount, but the District Court was convinced ‘to a legal certainty’ that not every 
individual owner in the class had suffered pollution damages in excess of $10,000.”); see also 
Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 492–93 (discussing Zahn). Zahn has since been abrogated by statute. 
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 556 (2005) (noting that Zahn has 
been abrogated by 28 U.S.C. § 1367). 
 55. Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301 (citing Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 338 (1969)). 
 56. 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1436 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
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concluding that a federal court could certify the class, Justice Scalia, 
writing for a plurality, emphasized that Rule 23 was simply a “joinder” 
device that “allows willing plaintiffs to join their separate claims against 
the same defendants in a class action.”57 The plurality further stated that 
“like traditional joinder, [Rule 23] leaves the parties’ legal rights and 
duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged,”58 which presumably 
includes each party’s duty to satisfy the requirements of Article III.  
However, there is also support for the “representative” view of the class 
action. For example, in Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper, the 
Court addressed whether class representatives whose claims had been 
mooted nevertheless had standing to appeal the denial of their motion to 
certify the class action.59 As in Symczyk and the cases discussed there, the 
Roper Court addressed whether the mootness of the class representatives’ 
claims mooted the entire class action. However, unlike the cases discussed 
in Symczyk, Roper did not involve a certified class, which would have 
made the other class members parties to the action under existing law.60 
Nevertheless, the Roper Court concluded that the class representatives 
had standing because “they retain[ed] a continuing individual interest in 
the resolution of the class certification question in their desire to shift part 
of the costs of litigation to those who will share in its benefits if the class is 
certified and ultimately prevails.”61 In fact, in concluding that this 
economic interest was sufficient for standing purposes, the Court further 
noted that the “prospect of such fee arrangements” was essential to 
motivate “private attorney general[s]” to “bring cases that for economic 
reasons might not be brought otherwise.”62  
In United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, a case decided the 
same day as Roper, the Court further concluded that such an economic 
interest was unnecessary for a class representative with a mooted claim to 
appeal the denial of a class certification motion.63 Unlike in Roper, the 
purported representative in Geraghty sought injunctive relief concerning 
his conditions of confinement, and, after his release, he conceded that he 
had no other interest in the suit.64 Nevertheless, the Court suggested that an 
interest in certifying a class action was sufficient for purposes of Article III 
standing, noting that this right “is more analogous to the private attorney 
                                                                                                                     
 57. Id. at 1443. 
 58. Id.; see also Kevin M. Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 987, 1029 (2011) (noting that the Shady Grove Court concluded that the coverage of a Rule 
23 class action “involv[es] the reach of joinder”). 
 59. 445 U.S. 326, 329–31 (1980). Like in Symczyk, the representative plaintiffs in Roper 
rejected settlement offers that would have satisfied their entire claims. Id. at 329. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 336. 
 62. Id. at 338. 
 63. 445 U.S. 388, 402–03, 407 (1980). 
 64. Id. at 394–95; see also id. at 420 n.14 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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general concept than to the type of interest traditionally thought to satisfy 
the ‘personal stake’ requirement.”65 
Accordingly, in both Roper and Geraghty, the Court suggested that the 
class action itself, even if uncertified, gives the purported class 
representative sufficient standing to sue, separate and apart from the 
standing of the purported class members. Admittedly, these precedents 
have since been questioned, although neither has been overruled.66 But 
both suggest that only the standing of the class representative was 
necessary for purposes of satisfying Article III. 
Additional support for the representative view comes from the text of 
Rule 23, which not only allows for “representative parties” to file suit on 
behalf of a class, but further provides that the class action is only 
permissible when “the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable.”67 This text suggests that the class action is an exception to 
“joinder,” not an example of it. 
The Court has also implicitly accepted a representative view in some 
cases that predate the current version of Rule 23. For example, in Supreme 
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, the Court permitted diverse class 
representatives to file suit in federal court even though the citizenship of 
the class members would have destroyed complete diversity.68 Similarly, in 
Handley v. Stutz, a creditors’ bill class action was filed in which the 
representative plaintiffs met the jurisdictional amount in controversy 
requirement, but many class members did not.69 In contrast to Zahn, the 
Court affirmed the denial of a motion for lack of jurisdiction, noting that 
the circuit court “had jurisdiction of the case” because it could distribute 
the funds recovered “as a trust fund for the benefit of all the creditors of the 
corporation.”70 
                                                                                                                     
 65. Id. at 403. 
 66. See infra Section II.A. 
 67. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). 
 68. 255 U.S. 356, 364–66 (1921) (holding that “[d]iversity of citizenship gave the District 
Court jurisdiction,” and that “[t]he intervention of the Indiana citizens in the suit would not have 
defeated the jurisdiction already acquired”); see also Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 501 (noting this 
aspect of Ben-Hur). The Court has since concluded that Article III only requires “minimal 
diversity” in the class action context and other contexts. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 584 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Article III “demand[s] 
no more than ‘minimal diversity,’ i.e., so long as one party on the plaintiffs’ side and one party on 
the defendants’ side are of diverse citizenship”). Congress has also recently amended the diversity 
statute to relax the citizenship and amount-in-controversy requirements for class actions and similar 
cases. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012). 
 69. 137 U.S. 366, 369–70 (1890). 
 70. Id. at 369; see also Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 493–94 (discussing Handley v. Stutz). 
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B.  The Trust View of the Class Action 
The Court’s decision in Handley v. Stutz suggests a third, distinct 
conception of the class action for justiciability purposes, one that I have 
discussed briefly in prior writings.71 This third conception views the class 
action as a trust device that effectively makes the class attorney the trustee 
of the class members’ claims for the benefit of the class. This section 
provides a more detailed argument in favor of this trust view of the class 
action.72 Specifically, this section shows the superiority of the trust view to 
the joinder and representative views of the class action. 
Admittedly, the trust view of the class action has little to no explicit 
support in the law of federal class actions. As noted above, the Court in 
Handley v. Stutz conceptualized the creditors’ bill class action as a trust 
action for the benefit of the creditors.73 However, few federal courts, if any, 
have followed the Handley Court’s lead.  
Instead, the trust view of the class action derives its support from the 
function of the class action. In other words, the trust view is based on what 
the class action actually does, not on what courts and scholars say it does. I 
acknowledge at the outset that the class action may perform a variety of 
functions.74 I also acknowledge that the class action is not the only 
procedural device that performs a trust function.75 However, this Article 
focuses on the trust function of the class action because it provides the best 
explanation for why the class action is “superior” in the situations where it 
has been permitted.76 Put another way, this Article focuses on the trust 
function of the class action because it is the one function that explains why 
                                                                                                                     
 71. See Campos, Proof, supra note 25, at 771–76; see also Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 
25, at 1076–79. 
 72. As noted earlier, I also plan to provide a comprehensive trust model of the class action, 
which I will use to address other issues in class action law. See Campos, Trust, supra note 25. 
 73.  See Handley, 137 U.S. at 369. 
 74. E.g., Campos, Proof, supra note 25, at 766 (acknowledging the argument that the class 
action more efficiently uses judicial resources). 
 75. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1079 n.89 (noting that multidistrict litigation also 
involves a loss of control over the claim, and can be called “quasi-class actions,” citing sources); cf. 
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Adequately Representing Groups, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3043, 3070 
(noting that the “adequacy of representation” concerns found in the class action can also be found in 
parens patriae and multidistrict litigation). 
 76. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (defining a residual category of class actions that are 
permitted only if, among other things, the court finds “that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy”). Given that the class 
action does not uniquely perform a trust function, there is some question whether the superiority 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) requires courts to consider alternatives such as multidistrict litigation. 
See ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 2.02(b)(4) (concluding that the alternatives that should be 
considered in a “superiority” analysis include “an administrative aggregation” such as multidistrict 
litigation). 
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courts have preferred the class action in certain situations over the 
procedures that would ordinarily apply to each individual’s claim.77 
As I have argued previously, the clearest example of the trust function 
of the class action arises in the context of litigation involving small 
claims.78 In small claims litigation, the defendant allegedly commits a 
common legal violation that injures a large number of dispersed plaintiffs. 
However, each plaintiff’s injury is too small to provide an incentive to file 
a lawsuit separately. Accordingly, each plaintiff will not file her “negative 
value” claim, which allows the defendant to escape liability altogether.79 
Both courts and scholars acknowledge that the class action solves the 
problem of insufficient stakes in small claims litigation.80 The class action 
does so because it forces the plaintiffs to share any common litigation costs 
under the “common fund” doctrine,81 while such forced sharing is not 
                                                                                                                     
 77. See David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs 
Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 394–95 (2000) (distinguishing between class treatment and the 
“separate action process”); see also In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir. 
2002) (distinguishing between the class action as “central planner” model and “a decentralized 
process of multiple trials, involving different juries, and different standards of liability, in different 
jurisdictions” (quoting In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995))). 
 78. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1077; Campos, Proof, supra note 25, at 772. 
 79. See David Betson & Jay Tidmarsh, Optimal Class Size, Opt-Out Rights, and 
“Indivisible” Remedies, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 542, 546–47 (2011) (defining “‘small-stakes’ or 
‘negative-value’ cases” as “cases in which no class member has an incentive to bring a case on his 
or her own”); see also Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (noting 
that a defendant can escape liability in small claims litigation because “only a lunatic or a fanatic 
sues for $30”). 
 80. E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very 
core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide 
the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” (emphasis 
added) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))); Deposit Guar. 
Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 324, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not economically feasible to obtain 
relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits for damages, 
aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the class-action 
device.”); Jonathon R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action 
and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1991) (“In the absence of the class action device, such injuries would often go 
unremedied because most individual plaintiffs would not themselves have a sufficient economic 
stake in the litigation to incur the litigation costs.”). I have written separately that the problem of 
insufficient stakes also applies in the mass tort context because, like small claims litigation, the 
stakes are substantially asymmetric between the defendant and any one plaintiff. See Campos, Mass 
Torts, supra note 25, at 1074–76. 
 81. E.g., 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1:7 (5th 
ed. 2011) (“The class action device solves this problem [of insufficient stakes] by aggregating many 
individual claims into a single suit and distributing the costs of representation across the entire 
claimant group.”); see also Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478–79 (1980) (defining the 
“common fund” doctrine). 
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possible when class members file separate claims.82 Moreover, common 
litigation costs pervade small claims litigation because the defendant’s 
alleged common legal violation inevitably results in issues of fact and law 
that are the same for each plaintiff.83 By investing in common issues 
together and apportioning those costs equally among themselves, each 
plaintiff reduces her own individual costs.  
Put another way, the class action allows the plaintiffs to use “economies 
of scale” to invest in common issues, which reduces the cost of these 
investments for each individual plaintiff.84 Consequently, litigation 
investments such as legal research, experts, and document review are less 
expensive for each plaintiff when these investments are divided over 
thousands of other plaintiffs. For example, the cost of an expert on a 
factual issue that is the same for each plaintiff may be prohibitive for one 
plaintiff (say, $1 million). However, it would only cost a fraction of the 
total amount for the plaintiff if she splits the costs with other class 
members (with 999 other plaintiffs, only $1,000 each).85 
Although courts and scholars correctly identify the forced cost sharing 
function of the class action, few, if any, discuss with precision how the 
class action produces forced sharing. Under the joinder view, for example, 
forced sharing would never occur. The joinder view suggests that some 
form of consent is necessary to force class members to share common costs 
because the joinder view “leaves the parties’ legal rights and duties 
intact.”86 If so, the very transaction costs that make “joinder of all 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See Betson & Tidmarsh, supra note 79, at 548 n.25 (“Although it is possible for a court to 
require parties who benefit from the creation of a common fund to share in the costs of creating that 
fund, the ‘common fund’ concept has never been extended so far as to require later plaintiffs who 
sue independently to reimburse earlier plaintiffs whose cases eased their own paths to recovery.” 
(citation omitted) (citing Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 170 (1939))). 
 83. See David Rosenberg & Kathryn E. Spier, On Structural Bias in the Litigation of 
Common Question Claims 1–2 (Aug. 1, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950196; cf. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1069–72 
(noting the similar prevalence of common issues in mass tort litigation, which also arises from the 
defendant’s common conduct). 
 84. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 272 (6th ed. 2012) (defining 
“economies of scale” as arising “[w]hen long-run average total cost declines as output increases”). 
Here, the “output” would be the development of the claim. It is well recognized that aggregation 
procedures like the class action “make small claims viable by taking advantage of economies of 
scale.” ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 1.05 reporters’ notes cmt. c; see also Rosenberg, supra 
note 77, at 394 (discussing the inherent scale advantage a defendant has in mass tort and small 
claims litigation). 
 85. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1075–76 & n.76 (discussing a similar example 
in mass tort litigation (citing Rosenberg, supra note 77, at 399–400)). 
 86. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) 
(Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (discussing how Rule 23 is, in some respects, “like . . . joinder”). 
Arguably the joinder view can be understood in a more limited sense as leaving each party’s Article 
III obligations the same but permitting the Court to impose additional duties, such as a duty to 
contribute to a common fund. Indeed, some joinder devices such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
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members . . . impracticable”87 in the absence of the class action would 
remain because each plaintiff would have to agree to split all costs.88  
Unlike the joinder view, the representative view only requires one 
plaintiff to step forward and tax each of the class members for all common 
investments. The “common fund” doctrine, in fact, permits the taxing of all 
benefitting class members without their consent.89 However, assuming that 
the plaintiff only cares about her net expected recovery,90 it is unclear why 
any plaintiff would step forward. Even though the plaintiff’s costs are 
reduced, the plaintiff’s individual payoff remains the same. It is unlikely 
that any one plaintiff would want to front the costs of litigating the class 
action when she could “sit back” and wait for another plaintiff to come 
forward.91 In fact, the opportunity costs involved in successfully litigating 
the class action, rather than doing something else, are most likely too 
substantial given the small payoff, even if the payoff is positive.92 
In addition, there is a risk that the class representative may not collect 
the tax from each plaintiff. The class representative plaintiff may lose. She 
may also find that collecting the tax from the other class members is too 
costly. Consequently, the representative view would effectively require the 
                                                                                                                     
13, which concerns compulsory counterclaims, force parties to do things without their consent. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 13(a). See generally Effron, supra note 43, at 771–73 (discussing the multiple functions 
of “joinder” devices and questioning whether “joinder” is a coherent concept). For the sake of 
clarity, this Article will focus on a more encompassing conception of the “joinder” view because it 
better accords with Judge Wood’s and Justice Scalia’s view that a joinder conception of the class 
action leaves the claims intact in all respects. Cf. Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 459 (defining the 
“joinder” view to require that “[e]very member of a class . . . must independently satisfy all 
procedural requirements for appearing before the court in question” (emphasis added)). 
 87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (defining the numerosity requirement). 
 88. ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 263 (2003) 
(“It is true that class members could achieve these same benefits [of cost-sharing] by organizing 
voluntarily. However, the transaction costs of organizing a large group are simply too high.”); see 
also Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1079–80 (noting the similar problem of transaction 
costs in mass tort litigation undermining voluntarily cost sharing). 
 89. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980) (permitting a district court to use 
the “common-fund doctrine” to apportion attorneys’ fees and other costs against the unclaimed 
portion of a class action judgment). 
 90. One goal of this Article is to show that parties may care about things other than the 
pecuniary value of the potential recovery, particularly in litigation involving constitutional issues. 
See infra Section III.B. Here, this Article assumes that the class members in small claims litigation 
only care about their net expected recovery because it is an assumption that is universally accepted 
by courts and scholars in discussing small claims litigation, as evidenced by the common view that 
“only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.” Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th 
Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (discussing small claims litigation). 
 91. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) (noting that, in a small 
claims class action, the absent plaintiff can “sit back and allow the litigation to run its course, 
content in knowing that there are safeguards provided for his protection”). 
 92. Cf. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
2043, 2056–74 (2010) (discussing the optimal fee for class action attorneys, and arguing that they 
should receive the entire recovery). 
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class representative to “vouch for the entire costs,” and in small claims 
litigation, “[o]nly a lunatic would do so.”93 
Given the deficiencies of the joinder and representative views, most 
courts and scholars recognize that the class action is meant to give “an 
attorney” an incentive to bring suit, not any of the class members 
themselves.94 It is not a class member, but the attorney who is “willing to 
underwrite the costs” of investing in the class action.95 This is because the 
class attorney “invest[s] . . . on contingent fee, taking the risk of failure in 
exchange for a premium award if the class prevails.”96  
In more specific terms, the class attorney is usually (but not always) 
compensated with a percentage of any net recovery of the plaintiffs as a 
whole.97 Moreover, the class attorney has the option to settle the class 
action as a whole, without the class members’ consent, for an aggregate 
amount.98 In doing so, the class attorney can recoup all common costs, as 
                                                                                                                     
 93. Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J.) (rejecting a 
district court finding that the class representative was not adequate because he or she would not 
bear the total costs of the litigation, noting that “[t]he very feature that makes class treatment 
appropriate—small individual stakes and large aggregate ones—ensures that the representative will 
be unwilling to vouch for the entire costs”); see also Campos, Proof, supra note 25, at 776 & n.140 
(same, quoting Rand); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, 
and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 412 (2000) (“Client financing 
of the action is highly unlikely because of the inherent collective action problem in class actions; 
that is, a class representative who expects to receive one percent (or less) of the recovery will not 
logically finance one hundred percent of the action’s costs.”). 
 94. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (noting that the class action 
“aggregat[es] the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an 
attorney’s) labor” (emphasis added) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th 
Cir. 1997))); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (“A critical fact in this 
litigation is that petitioner’s individual stake in the damages award he seeks is only $70. No 
competent attorney would undertake this complex antitrust action to recover so inconsequential an 
amount. Economic reality dictates that petitioner’s suit proceed as a class action or not at all.” 
(emphasis added)); see also ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 2.02 cmt. b (noting that class actions 
are “superior” when the claims are not “viab[le],” defined as “the prospect, in practice, that 
claimants would obtain representation in the market for legal services in the absence of aggregate 
treatment”); BONE, supra note 88, at 262 (“The large potential recovery in the class action can 
attract a better lawyer than would be interested in an individual suit and the efficiencies of group 
litigation make possible a higher level of investment in discovery and trial preparation.” (emphasis 
added)); Campos, Proof, supra note 25, at 772–73 (quoting Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 617); 
Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1077 (same). 
 95. Rand, 926 F.2d at 599. 
 96. White v. Sunstrand Corp., 256 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.) (discussing 
the risk of uncompensated time). 
 97. See ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 3.13(a) cmt. b (noting the preference for “the 
percentage [of the fee] method” among courts and scholars, although noting that some attorneys are 
compensated by a “lodestar” method, which looks at the actual time spent on the litigation). 
 98. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (providing procedures for attorneys concerning the “settlement, 
voluntary dismissal, or compromise” of a class action). As noted above, scholars heavily criticize 
this aspect of the class action. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Linda S. Mullenix, 
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well as her fee, against this common fund, thereby producing the forced 
sharing of common costs among the class members. The class attorney can 
also recover in the aggregate after a successful judgment, and similarly 
assess common costs against the fund and collect her fee.99 
Accordingly, the class attorney, unlike any one plaintiff or group of 
plaintiffs, has an incentive to file a class action and develop issues 
common to the class. The class attorney’s expected payoff is both large and 
correlated to the total payoff to the class. Moreover, the class attorney has 
the necessary control over the claims to make any investment worthwhile. 
Unlike the class members, the class attorney can file the action and collect 
from the common fund, rather than depend on the actions of the other class 
members to contribute to any common investments. 
As I have pointed out in previous writings, the ability of the class 
attorney to exercise dispositive control over the class members’ claims, 
coupled with receiving a large, partial interest in any net recovery, 
functionally creates a trust.100 Specifically, the class attorney’s right to 
exercise dispositive control over the claims, including the right to settle the 
claims, functionally mirrors the “title” assigned to trustees to exercise 
dispositive control over any trust assets.101 Moreover, the class attorney’s 
percentage fee arrangement is similar to trust arrangements where the 
                                                                                                                     
Taking Adequacy Seriously: The Inadequate Assessment of Adequacy in Litigation and Settlement 
Classes, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1687, 1700–02 (2004) (criticizing the “rubber stamping” of class action 
settlements by courts in Rule 23(e) fairness hearings). 
 99. 3 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 10.12, at 505 
(4th ed. 2002) (noting that “[w]hen classwide damages are amenable to proof by the class 
representative, a lump sum damage award is possible on behalf of the class”); see also id. § 10.5 
(“Aggregate computation of class monetary relief is lawful and proper.”). 
 100. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1078–79; Campos, Proof, supra note 25, at 774–
75. The trust view of the class action, no matter its tacit acceptance in practice, raises significant 
due process and ethical concerns because it permits a court to take dispositive control of the claims 
away from the class members (in effect taking the class members’ property), and to assign such 
control to the class attorney. I addressed the due process concerns in great detail in a prior article. 
See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1115–21. In a nutshell, I argue that the due process 
analysis should recognize the primary legal entitlement the plaintiffs have in avoiding the legal 
violation, and that assigning the right to control the claim to the class attorney better protects this 
primary entitlement (as well as provide better compensation) than letting the plaintiffs retain control 
over their claims. See id. at 1092–1121. I have not addressed whether the trust function of the class 
action would be consistent with the law of ethics, although it obviously does not accord with 
current law. See Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 7, at 312–13. Finally, the law of champerty and 
maintenance restricts the assignment of claims, although some scholars criticize these restrictions. 
See, e.g., Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 62 (2011) (criticizing the 
law of champerty and maintenance). 
 101. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003) (defining a “trust” as a “fiduciary 
relationship” which “subject[s] the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal with it for 
the benefit of . . . one or more persons,” at least one of whom is not the sole trustee); see also M.W. 
LAU, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRUSTS 148 (2011) (“The legal title, in theory, gives the trustee 
complete control and dominion over the trust asset.”). 
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trustee is given a partial beneficial interest in the proceeds produced by 
trust assets.102 
Finally, while a trustee of a trust has title and a beneficial interest in the 
trust asset, the remaining beneficial interest in the asset remains assigned to 
the beneficiaries.103 Likewise, in the class action context, the class 
attorney’s dispositive control over the claims is for the benefit of the class 
members. It is the class members who are the beneficiaries of the class 
attorney’s exercise of control over the claims.104 Indeed, the class attorney, 
like a trustee, owes a fiduciary duty to the class members insofar as both 
Rule 23 and the Due Process Clause require the attorney to adequately 
represent the class members’ interests.105 
But more importantly, it is the trust function of the class action that 
produces the forced sharing necessary to overcome the insufficient stakes 
in small claims litigation. As noted above, neither the joinder view nor the 
representative view of the class action provides a causal account of how 
the class action results in the forced sharing of common costs. In contrast, 
the trust view illustrates that it is the class attorney serving as trustee, and 
not the class or any one class member, which allows the class to benefit 
from economies of scale in a class action. 
Admittedly, the class action differs from an express trust because an 
express or donative trust is created by a settlor, who conveys the trust 
property to the trustee for the benefit of the beneficiaries.106 By contrast, a 
                                                                                                                     
 102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 38 & cmt. c (noting that “[a] trustee is entitled to 
reasonable compensation out of the trust estate for services as trustee,” and that some state statutes 
“provide that trustees’ fees are to be based on specified percentages of the principal or of the 
income and principal of the trust”); see also 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL., SCOTT AND ASCHER 
ON TRUSTS § 2.1.6 (5th ed. 2006) (“A trustee need not have a legal title to the subject 
matter . . . since it is possible for a trustee to hold an equitable interest in trust.”). 
 103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 3 cmt. d (noting that “[a] trustee holds the trust 
property for the benefit of a person or persons who are referred to as the ‘beneficiary’ or 
‘beneficiaries,’” and that “the trustee must hold property for the benefit of one or more persons, at 
least one of whom is not the sole trustee”). 
 104. Id. § 5 cmt. a (“A property arrangement may constitute a trust, as that term is used in this 
Restatement, even though such terms as ‘trust’ or ‘trustee’ are not used . . . .”); see also id. § 5 cmt. 
j (“One who is the trustee of a chose in action owes duties to the trust beneficiaries to enforce the 
chose and then pay the proceeds to, or hold and manage the proceeds for, the beneficiaries.”). 
 105. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g) (providing that a court “must appoint class counsel” and “may 
consider any other matter pertinent to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately represent the 
interests of the class”); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940) (holding that the Due 
Process Clause requires class action procedures to “fairly insure[] the protection of the interests of 
absent parties”). 
 106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 & cmt. a (2011) (defining a trust as “arising from a 
manifestation of intention to create that relationship”); 1 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 102, § 2.1.8 (“An 
express trust arises when the settlor manifests an intention to create it.”); Robert H. Sitkoff, An 
Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 624 (2004) (“In the prototypical 
donative trust, the settlor (‘S’) in effect contracts with the trustee (‘T’) to manage a portfolio of 
assets in the best interests of the beneficiaries (‘B1’ and ‘B2,’ collectively ‘Bs’) . . . .”). 
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class action is judicially imposed. But the concept of a “trust” is not limited 
to express trusts. For example, “constructive” trust arrangements are also 
judicially imposed when equity requires a person to take care of property 
for the benefit of another.107 In addition, there are other judicially created 
“trust” arrangements that are not formally considered trusts, but create 
analogous fiduciary obligations. These include the assignment of an 
administrator to control a decedent’s estate,108 the guardianship of property 
for one who lacks capacity,109 and bankruptcy trusteeships.110 
Moreover, a class action can be understood as an express trust if one 
views the judge as the settlor. Like a settlor, the judge creates the trust 
relationship between the trustee and the beneficiaries and defines the terms 
of the relationship through the class certification order.111 Moreover, the 
judge can be said to hold and convey property to the class attorney because 
the judge can create rights to bring an action, as evidenced by the creation 
of common law causes of action and implied rights of action.112 If the 
cause of action has a statutory or other legal source, the judge still holds 
the keys to the courthouse door, and can use doctrines such as standing to, 
                                                                                                                     
 107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. e (2001) (defining a “constructive trust,” and 
noting that, unlike an express trust, “a constructive trust is imposed, not necessarily to effectuate an 
expressed or implied intention, but to redress a wrong or to prevent unjust enrichment. A 
constructive trust is thus the result of judicial intervention and is remedial in character”). 
 108. Id. § 5(b) & cmt. c (noting that “[p]ersonal representatives of decedents’ estates and 
guardians, conservators, and their counterparts, by whatever name, are fiduciaries but they are not 
trustees,” although “many of the rules applicable to trustees are applicable to executors and 
administrators”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 6 & cmt. a (1959) (providing that “[a]n 
executorship or an administratorship is not a trust,” but noting that both are fiduciaries, and that the 
primary difference between the two is “the tribunals which enforced the duties” of each); 1 SCOTT 
ET AL., supra note 102, § 2.3.2 (noting that “[e]xecutors are often referred to as trustees, and, in a 
broad sense, they are,” with the only difference being that the duties of a trustee “depend on the 
terms of the trust,” while the duties of an executor “are generally limited to winding up of the 
decedent’s estate” (footnotes omitted)). 
 109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5(c) & cmt. c (noting that “many of the rules 
applicable to trustees are applicable to . . . guardians and conservators”); 1 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 
102, § 2.3.3 (“A guardian of the property of one under an incapacity is certainly a trustee in the 
broad sense of the term, because a guardian is under a duty to deal with the property for the ward’s 
benefit.”). 
 110. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5(d) & cmt. d (“When a corporation or an 
individual is insolvent, and in some other situations, the court may appoint a receiver to administer 
the corporation’s or individual’s property under court supervision. The receiver is a fiduciary but 
does not hold title to the property under administration and is not a trustee.”).  
 111. See 1 SCOTT ET AL., supra note 102, § 2.1.8 (noting that the trust instrument governs the 
relationship between the trustee and the beneficiaries, and thus, “an express trust is like a contract 
or a mortgage”); Sitkoff, supra note 106, at 624–25 (noting that, as a positive and normative matter, 
the law of trusts “gives priority to the settlor over the beneficiaries as the trustee’s primary 
principal” given that the trust is governed by “the ex ante instructions of the settlor”). 
 112. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 
(1971) (recognizing an implied right for damages against federal officers who allegedly violated the 
Fourth Amendment). 
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in effect, convey or withhold the right to bring an action. Indeed, one can 
understand a party who has a right to bring a lawsuit as having a 
presumptive license from the government to enforce the law through a 
lawsuit. But, despite the initial assignment of an enforcement license to a 
party, the court still retains a right to revoke the license and convey the 
license to someone else for the benefit of others.113 
Finally, it is worth acknowledging that the trust function does not 
perfectly align the class attorney’s incentive to invest in common issues 
with the incentives of the defendant to defend common issues. First, 
federal courts generally do not permit class action attorneys to recover if 
they lose at trial, or otherwise impose costs that go beyond what each 
plaintiff recovers.114 The general inability of class counsel to spread the 
costs of nonmeritorious litigation means that class attorneys may have less 
of an incentive to develop the litigation than the defendant, who can spread 
costs regardless of the outcome.  
Second, the class attorney typically only receives a percentage of the 
total net recovery, while the defendant receives all of the benefits of 
successful litigation. If the percentage the class attorney recovers is too 
small, then the class attorney may suffer from the same deficient incentives 
of the class representative under the representative view. As noted above, 
under the representative view, the small potential payoff for any one 
plaintiff makes it unlikely that any plaintiff would step forward to litigate 
on behalf of the class.115  
But it is important not to make the perfect the enemy of the good. As an 
initial matter, the class members suffer from the same inability to tax 
others for losing efforts. Moreover, the court can establish the fee so that it 
gives the class attorney a payoff that is sufficiently large and directly 
correlated with the total net aggregate recovery associated with all common 
issues.116 Most importantly, class members can only obtain as large an 
incentive as the class attorney by informally aggregating, which involves 
significant transaction costs that the class attorney avoids because she is 
                                                                                                                     
 113. For an account of the function of standing that implies this “license” view of the right to 
bring a lawsuit, see Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article II Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 781, 784 (2009) (arguing that “[s]tanding enforces the Article II nondelegation 
principle by curtailing private prosecutorial discretion”). 
 114. For a counterexample, see Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston, 92 F.3d 506, 508, 512 (7th Cir. 
1996), where the Seventh Circuit affirmed a state court settlement of a class action in which one 
class member received $2.19 in benefits but was assessed a fee of $91.33 to cover costs. Kamilewicz 
has been heavily criticized and few cases have followed its lead. See Patrick Woolley, Collateral 
Attack and the Role of Adequate Representation in Class Suits for Money Damages, 58 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 917, 917 (2010). 
 115. See supra text accompanying notes 91–94. 
 116. In fact, the best approach for small claims litigation may be to assign the entire recovery 
to the attorney, as some have proposed. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 92, at 2046–47; Sitkoff, supra 
note 106, at 637 (noting that “no compensation short of transferring complete ownership . . . will 
solve the incentive problem in all possible scenarios when the agent’s efforts are unobservable”). 
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assigned dispositive control over all claims.117 In fact, it is precisely these 
transaction costs that justify the use of the class action, which is only 
permitted when “joinder of all members is impracticable.”118 
C.  The Class Action Categories 
This Article has argued so far that the class action solves the problem of 
insufficient incentives in small claims litigation because of its trust 
function. This trust function, moreover, is not adequately captured by the 
joinder or representative views of the class action. 
But small claims litigation does not exhaust the universe of cases where 
federal courts have permitted class actions. Rule 23 defines two further 
categories of cases where class actions are considered appropriate. The first 
category, defined under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and Rule 23(b)(2), permits class 
actions when separate actions “would create a risk of . . . incompatible 
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class,”119 such as when the 
plaintiffs seek “final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief” 
which applies to “the class as a whole.”120 The second category, defined 
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), permits class actions when separate actions, “as a 
practical matter . . . would substantially impair or impede [the nonparties’] 
ability to protect their interests.”121 The second category primarily 
encompasses class actions involving limited funds, where “the shared 
character of rights claimed or relief awarded entails that any individual 
adjudication by a class member disposes of, or substantially affects, the 
interests of absent class members.”122 
The trust function of the class action also explains the superiority of the 
class action for these two separate categories. Both of these categories 
parallel two situations in which parties are required to join a nonparty 
under Rule 19.123 Under Rule 19(a), a “required party” must be joined if, 
                                                                                                                     
 117. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1079–81 (discussing the inferiority of 
informal aggregation). 
 118. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1) (permitting a class action if “the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable”). Notably in settlement class actions, where the action is 
certified only for settlement purposes, the class attorney may have an incentive to settle too cheaply 
because she cannot threaten a litigation class action. Instead, the class attorney will accept any offer 
that is greater than the expected recovery obtainable by the attorney’s actual clients. See Howard M. 
Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 2) (noting this problem). This Article focuses only on litigation class actions, which 
avoid this problem. 
 119. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A). 
 120. Id. 23(b)(2); see ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 2.04 & reporters’ notes cmt. a 
(“Courts . . . have not succeeded in giving any distinct meaning to Rule 23(b)(1)(A) by comparison 
to Rule 23(b)(2).”). 
 121. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B). 
 122. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 834 (1999). 
 123. See Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386 (1967) (“Approaching [R]ule 23, 
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among other things, failure to join would “leave an existing party subject to 
a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent 
obligations because of the interest.”124 This category corresponds to the 
first class action category defined under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) and Rule 
23(b)(2). Rule 19(a) also requires a “required party” to be joined if failure 
to do so would, “as a practical matter[,] impair or impede the [nonparty’s] 
ability to protect the interest.”125 This category corresponds to the second 
class action category defined under Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 
At a superficial level the joinder view of the class action is consistent 
with Rule 19, since both presume the literal joining of all parties to avoid 
the prejudice caused by separate actions. Nevertheless, the joinder view is 
at odds with the reality of class actions. The class action only applies if 
“joinder of all members is impracticable.”126 Moreover, for both of these 
class action categories, notice to absent parties is not required.127 This not 
only demonstrates that the joining of all parties is not contemplated for 
either category, but makes the actual joining of all plaintiffs practically 
impossible. 
The representative view of the class action fares far worse than the 
joinder view in explaining why class actions are permitted for the two class 
action categories defined above. As noted above, Rule 19, which mirrors 
the two class action categories, seeks to join nonparties as parties when the 
existing parties would prejudice the interests of those absent. By contrast, 
the representative view assumes that the existing party will adequately 
represent the interests of the nonparties.128 Consequently, under the 
representative view, class actions would be permitted in both categories 
even though, by Rule 19’s very terms, the existing parties would not 
adequately represent the interests of nonparties.129 
                                                                                                                     
then, in much the same spirit in which it was considering [R]ule 19, the Committee strove to sort 
out the factual situations or patterns that had recurred in class actions and appeared with varying 
degrees of convincingness to justify treatment of the class in solido.”). 
 124. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a)(1)(B)(i). 
 125. Id. 19(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
 126. Id. 23(a)(1). 
 127. See id. 23(c)(2)(A) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court may 
[but not must] direct appropriate notice to the class.”). 
 128. See id. 23(a)(4) (requiring that “representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 
the interests of the class”); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940) (only permitting a 
class action when absent class members “are in fact adequately represented by the parties who are 
present”). 
 129. See John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 
1431 (2003) (noting that Rule 23(b)(1)(B) “identifies the class members’ competing interests in the 
limited fund as a basis for bringing the lawsuit as a class action, when in fact that competition 
between class members gives the court a reason to deny class certification” (emphasis added)); see 
also id. at 1429 (noting that, for Rule 23(b)(1)(A) situations, “[w]hen there is a danger of 
incompatibility, there is less typicality and worse interest representation. Far from being a 
requirement for class actions, this type of case should make a court skeptical of a class action”); cf. 
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As with small claims litigation, the trust view of the class action 
overcomes the inadequacies of the joinder and representative views for the 
two categories defined under Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2). By viewing 
the class attorney as trustee of the plaintiffs’ claims, the trust view is not 
predicated on the joinder of all parties. Moreover, by not relying on the 
plaintiffs to act at all, the trust view avoids the inadequate representation 
that results from the representative view. 
Most importantly, the trust view rationalizes the use of class actions for 
these two categories. As for the first category, class actions are seldom 
used because a single plaintiff can seek an injunction that benefits the class 
as a whole without filing a class action. The only thing the class action 
accomplishes is the avoidance of mootness.130  
The trust view, at the very least, demonstrates how the class action can 
avoid mootness when the named plaintiff’s claim becomes moot, the very 
situation addressed in cases like Symczyk, Roper, and Geraghty. By 
creating a trust, the class action, in effect, designates the class attorney as a 
party whose interest is tied to the existence of the class as a whole.131 Thus, 
as long as a class remains, the class attorney’s legal interest as trustee 
survives even if one class member’s claim does not. The class attorney, 
moreover, can typically seek fees and costs in actions involving injunctive 
relief, and thus would have the requisite incentive to litigate the case, a 
point that was missed in Geraghty.132 
As to the second category, it is unclear why any plaintiff would bring a 
class action. Because this category primarily applies in situations that 
involve a limited fund, it is unclear why a plaintiff would bring a class 
action, let alone join any other plaintiffs, rather than collect fully on the 
fund.133 Under the trust view, however, a class action makes sense in the 
limited fund context because the class attorney’s fee is based on the size of 
the fund as a whole. Thus, the class attorney has an incentive to invest in 
                                                                                                                     
Jay Tidmarsh, Rethinking Adequacy of Representation, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1158–67 (2009) 
(noting that Rule 23(b)(1)(A), 23(b)(1)(B), and 23(b)(2) class actions are rife with conflicts). 
 130. See Developments, supra note 42, at 1464–66 (noting the case law that treats the class 
action as providing protection against the mootness of the class representative’s claim); see also 
U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 404–05 (1980) (noting that the mootness of a class 
representative’s claim does not moot a certified class action). But see HART & WECHSLER, supra 
note 8, at 220 (questioning whether a class action actually changes the mootness requirements). 
 131. See FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1)(E) (providing that “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest,” but that parties like a “trustee of an express trust” may “sue in 
their own names”). 
 132. Justice Powell at least acknowledged, however, that the class attorney and the defendants 
are the only ones who have an interest in the litigation “[i]n any realistic sense.” Geraghty, 445 U.S. 
at 424 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 133. Tidmarsh, supra note 129, at 1159 (“By definition . . . the self-interested plaintiff could 
care less about equitable treatment. She is interested in getting as much of the pie for herself as 
possible; she is under no obligation to—and therefore will not—seek class treatment unless the 
class action helps her achieve her goals.” (footnote omitted)). 
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common issues on behalf of all the plaintiffs to ensure that all of the 
plaintiffs can recover on as much of the fund as possible.134 Unlike an 
individual class member, the class attorney would not seek to recover a 
portion of the fund at the expense of other plaintiffs. 
D.  Trust v. Agency 
Other scholars recognize that the class action allows plaintiffs to benefit 
from economies of scale by assigning dispositive control over their claims 
to a third party.135 But instead of analogizing the class action to a trust, 
these scholars analogize the class action to other governance arrangements 
that also separate ownership and control to exploit economies of scale.  
For example, Professor David Shapiro analogizes the class action to a 
corporate entity, which also involves an assignment of dispositive control 
to third parties such as directors and officers for the benefit of 
shareholders.136 Likewise, other scholars such as Professors Elizabeth 
Burch, Samuel Issacharoff, and the late Richard Nagareda have appealed to 
political entities such as the state, analogizing “the relationship between 
class members and class representatives as one between the representatives 
(the governors) and the members (the governed).”137 
The trust view differs from these other views in one crucial respect. 
Under the agency principles that underlie corporate law and, arguably, the 
law of political entities,138 an agent like a director or a politician 
“undertakes to act on behalf of his principal and is subject to his 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Cf. id. at 1160 (noting that a class action may be filed in litigation involving a limited 
fund because “[t]he increase in the chance of success plus the ability to spread costs and attorneys 
fees makes class treatment worthwhile”). 
 135. ALI, PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 1.05 reporters’ note cmt. a (noting that “[a] foundational 
insight of the economic literature on agency relationships is that ownership of assets and control of 
their disposition must often be separated to achieve economies of scale”); see id. § 1.05 cmt. a 
(noting that “a common structural feature of all aggregate proceedings [is] the loss of control of 
litigation by persons whose interests are at issue”). 
 136. See David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 913, 917, 921 (1998) (arguing that, for preclusion purposes, the “class” is the party rather than 
each individual class member, analogizing the class to “a whole range of voluntary private 
associations—congregations, trade unions, joint stock companies, corporations” as well as 
“municipalities and other governmental entities”). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 5 
cmt. g (2003) (noting that “[c]orporate officers and directors . . . do not hold title to the property of 
the corporation and therefore are not trustees”). 
 137. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Governing Securities Class Actions, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 299, 
305–06 (2011) (citing Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 366; Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the 
Administrative State: Kalven and Rosenfeld Revisited, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 638 (2008)). 
 138. See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 676 (2013) 
(noting that “[p]olitical representatives are agents acting on behalf of diffuse principals: the 
people,” and that political entities and corporations share the same “agency problem”).  
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control.”139 For example, in providing an “entity” account of the class 
action analogous to a corporation, Shapiro argues that the class action 
should require some form of accountability, such as an election of class 
counsel by the plaintiffs.140 Similarly, supporters of a political governance 
model of the class action stress the importance of establishing the 
“legitimacy” of the class attorney to exercise dispositive control over the 
claims.141 Although legitimacy is never defined with any precision, the 
term suggests a concern with allowing class members to have a “voice” in 
controlling the conduct of the class attorney.142 
In contrast, a trustee “is not subject to the control of the beneficiary, 
except that he is under a duty to deal with the trust property for his benefit 
in accordance with the terms of the trust and can be compelled by the 
beneficiary to perform this duty.”143 In other words, an agency relationship 
presumes control by the principal, while a trust relationship provides the 
beneficiaries little to no control over the trustee’s actions.144 
This distinction is crucial because introducing some beneficiary control 
in the class action context would be detrimental to the cost sharing 
function of the class action. As an initial matter, introducing beneficiary 
control is unnecessary. In both corporations and political entities, there is a 
concern that the ruling parties will not be sensitive to the preferences of the 
ruled. Thus, giving the ruled a voice to control the rulers is necessary.  
But such a concern is not present in the class action context. Unlike in a 
political entity, where the ruled may disagree about their objectives, all 
class members agree on the same objective: to win by investing in common 
                                                                                                                     
 139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 8 cmt. b (1959) (emphasis added) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 14B (1958)).  
 140. Shapiro, supra note 136, at 940 (“In the case of a trade union or corporation, there are 
preexisting individuals who have been authorized to speak for the entity and who normally would 
be the ones to work with counsel. In the case of a class that is, in effect, created for purposes of a 
particular litigation, there is likely to be no preexisting structure, and methods should be devised for 
creating that structure and endowing it with the widest representation consistent with efficient case 
management.”). 
 141. See Burch, supra note 137, at 306 (noting that the political governance model “adds a 
third, critical dimension: the demand for legitimacy in the institutional arrangement”). 
 142. Id. at 308–09 (praising the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) for 
requiring the appointment of lead representative class members because such representatives are 
“the real source of legitimacy” insofar as they “speak on behalf of other members’ unique interests” 
and “monitor the class attorneys”); Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 339 (“The legitimacy of any 
particular governmental arrangement then turns on the ability to curb oppressive, abusive, or self-
serving behavior that may emerge from within the newly created governing class.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 8 cmt. b (emphasis added); see also 1 SCOTT ET AL., 
supra note 102, § 2.3.4 (noting that under an agency relationship, the agent “is subject to the 
principal’s control,” while “a trustee must conform to the terms of the trust”); Sitkoff, supra note 
106, at 676 & n.68 (noting this difference). 
 144. See Sitkoff, supra note 106, at 624–25 (arguing that, as a positive and normative matter, 
trust law “gives priority to the settlor over the beneficiaries as the trustee’s primary principal”). 
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issues of liability. More importantly, the class attorney is already properly 
incentivized to invest in common issues, as this maximizes the attorney’s 
own payoff.145 Even in class actions involving injunctions, the class 
attorney has an interest in establishing the defendant’s liability for the class 
because her potential fees and her ability to spread costs among the class 
depend on it. Accordingly, nothing is added to this incentive by allowing 
the class members to control the actions of the class attorney through an 
election or similar procedure.  
More importantly, providing control to the class members is detrimental 
because such control recreates the collective action problems that the class 
action is designed to solve in the first place. If plaintiffs are insufficiently 
motivated to sue, as in most small-claims class actions, they are most likely 
insufficiently motivated to vote. In fact, as demonstrated by empirical 
evidence, most class action plaintiffs do not even bother to collect any 
award recovered by the class attorney.146 If plaintiffs will not even collect 
any recovery, how can they be expected to select and monitor the class 
attorney? 
Even when some plaintiffs are sufficiently motivated to monitor the 
class attorney, as may be the case in an injunctive or limited fund class 
action, such monitoring would still be detrimental. Elections or similar 
monitoring procedures have transaction costs.147 Moreover, any 
disagreements with the class attorney will only reflect the private interests 
of the plaintiffs, not the interests of the class as a whole.148 Thus, allowing 
a plaintiff or a group of plaintiffs to restrain the class attorney may hold the 
class action hostage to the monitoring plaintiffs for a payoff.149 It may also 
result in suboptimal monitoring because of the free-riding of the 
monitoring plaintiffs’ efforts by the nonmonitoring plaintiffs.150 This 
                                                                                                                     
 145. Again, the class attorney is not perfectly incentivized. Nevertheless, class attorneys are 
“properly” incentivized in the sense that they have a large stake in the litigation that correlates with 
the plaintiffs’ total recovery. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 146. See Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims 
Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 315 (2010) (“Invariably, in small-claims 
consumer class actions, less than twenty percent or so of class action damages funds are distributed 
to plaintiff claimants.” (citing Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action 
Problems and Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 120 (2007)). 
 147. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1079–81 (arguing that deficient incentives and 
transaction costs caused by informal aggregation result in suboptimal investment in common 
issues). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Cf. Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core and an Analysis of 
Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 EMORY L.J. 85, 97 (1997) (noting that opt-out rights 
allow plaintiffs with high-value claims to hold out to extract payoffs). 
 150. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1116–17 (arguing that allowing class members to 
monitor class attorneys by opting out would lead to suboptimal investment in common issues 
because of free-riding); see also James D. Cox et al., Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical 
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1604–06 (2006) 
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would be detrimental to the class as a whole because either holding out or 
freeriding would likely result in suboptimal investment in common issues, 
which would lower the probability of recovery for the class as a whole. 
One could argue that class member control is still necessary because 
issues unique to each class member are routinely present in class actions. 
For example, in class actions involving damages, the damages must be 
distributed to each individual class member. Likewise, in class actions 
involving injunctive remedies, the class members may disagree as to the 
substance of the injunction once liability is established.151 Accordingly, the 
class members should be afforded a say in the class action’s conduct to 
protect their individual interests.  
Although plaintiff control may be necessary to protect each class 
members’ individual interests in the remedy, the plaintiffs cannot obtain a 
remedy without first establishing liability. Because establishing liability 
requires a class attorney to act for the benefit of the class as a whole, 
permitting control by the class members would be self-defeating. It would 
lead to a lower prospect of getting a remedy in the first place. Moreover, 
individual remedial issues can be separated from common issues of 
liability. For example, in class actions involving damages where the 
method for distributing damages is not obvious, damages can be 
determined after liability has been determined.152 Similarly, hearings can 
be held for determining the scope of an injunction after liability has been 
established.153 Thus, bifurcation can preserve individual control while still 
obtaining the benefits of the cost sharing provided by the class action. 
                                                                                                                     
(noting the reluctance of “institutional investors with large potential claims” to serve as lead 
plaintiffs in securities fraud litigation due, in part to “free rider problems, because institutions, 
particularly those concerned about minimizing administrative costs generally, are rationally apt to 
prefer that another investor take the initiative to become involved” (quoting Jill E. Fisch, Class 
Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 542 (1997)). 
 151. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 507 (1976) (noting conflicts among 
plaintiffs, particularly black parents, over the appropriate injunctive relief in school desegregation 
cases). 
 152. Campos, Proof, supra note 25, at 766–76 (discussing bifurcation as a method of 
distributing any aggregate recovery, and noting the possibility of damage scheduling to obviate the 
need for individual determinations of damages). In the context of large-claim class actions like 
those used in mass torts, many scholars have stressed the inherent conflict among the heterogeneous 
class members, who are “warring over the allocation of the settlement.” See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 
93, at 386–87. But, as I have argued previously, even in mass tort litigation, the plaintiffs have a 
common interest in proving common material issues of their claims. Moreover, procedures like 
bifurcation and damage scheduling can also be used to avoid conflicts among class members. 
Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1072–73, 1106. 
 153. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1112 n.279 (discussing this possibility). 
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II.  THE CLASS ACTION AND THE LAW OF JUSTICIABILITY 
The previous Part argued that the trust function of the class action 
provides the best justification for the use of class actions in all of the 
circumstances in which they are permitted. The trust view strongly 
suggests that the class attorney, as trustee, is the real party in interest for 
purposes of the litigation. Unlike the other class members, the trustee is the 
only one who has the appropriate (and largest) stake to invest in and 
litigate the class members’ claims.154 Accordingly, the trust view further 
suggests that the class attorney should have Article III standing in her own 
right. 
This Part addresses whether the current law of justiciability supports the 
trust view of the class action. Admittedly, and as discussed in more detail 
below, the Supreme Court has not embraced the view that the class 
attorney is the relevant party for purposes of Article III. But there is, in 
fact, substantial precedent which provides support for the trust view of the 
class action. Specifically, in many circumstances the Court has granted 
standing to a party who has not been injured or otherwise harmed by the 
alleged unlawful conduct.155 The Court has done so particularly when the 
injured parties cannot adequately protect their own interests. This is, in 
fact, the same justification for the use of class actions in situations where 
they are permitted. Accordingly, this precedent shows that, at the very 
least, the trust view of the class action—which permits the uninjured, 
unharmed class attorney to assert the rights of the injured class members—
is not as startling or as counterintuitive as it may seem.  
A.  Class Actions and Article III 
As background, Article III defines the limited jurisdiction of federal 
courts.156 The Supreme Court has interpreted the case or controversy terms 
of Article III as limiting the jurisdiction of a federal court to only 
“justiciable” actions.157 The Court has also recognized prudential 
considerations that are independent of the justiciability requirements of 
Article III, although “a clear separation of the constitutional and prudential 
aspects of the justiciability doctrines is often difficult because both reflect 
the same basic policy considerations.”158 
                                                                                                                     
 154. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a)(1) (providing that “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest,” but listing those who “may sue in their own names without joining the 
person for whose benefit the action is brought,” including “an executor,” “an administrator,” “a 
guardian,” and “a trustee of an express trust”). 
 155.  See infra Sections II.B & C. 
 156. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 (providing that the federal “judicial power” is limited to 
“cases” and “controversies” in enumerated, defined areas). 
 157. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 212 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There must be a justiciable case or controversy as required by Article III.”). 
 158. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.1, at 45 (5th ed. 2007). 
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Standing is generally considered the most important of the justiciability 
doctrines.159 A party has sufficient standing if she satisfies three 
requirements: she must have “[1] a personal injury [2] fairly traceable to 
the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and [3] likely to be redressed 
by the requested relief.”160 The “personal injury” requirement has been 
further defined as requiring an injury that is “concrete” and 
“particularized,”161 as opposed to a “generalized grievance” that is “plainly 
undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.”162 
The plaintiff’s claim also must be “ripe” because a federal court can 
only assert its jurisdiction “when the interests of litigants require the use of 
this judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. A 
hypothetical threat is not enough.”163 In other words, the injury must be 
“imminent,” rather than “speculative.”164 Conversely, the plaintiff’s claim 
must not be “moot,” defined as “when the issues presented are no longer 
‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”165 
In the past, the Court has referred to mootness as “the doctrine of 
standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist 
at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout 
its existence (mootness).”166 The Court recently reaffirmed this view by 
emphasizing that, under Article III, “the parties must continue to have a 
personal stake in the ultimate disposition of the lawsuit.”167 
But the Court has recently acknowledged that “the description of 
mootness as standing set in a time frame is not comprehensive.”168 For 
example, a party with a moot claim may proceed if the injury suffered and 
                                                                                                                     
 159. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“The case-or-controversy doctrines state 
fundamental limits on federal judicial power in our system of government. The Art[icle] III doctrine 
that requires a litigant to have ‘standing’ to invoke the power of a federal court is perhaps the most 
important of these doctrines.” (emphasis added)). 
 160. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013) (quoting Wright, 468 U.S. at 751) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). The “personal injury” requirement is sometimes referred to as 
the “actual injury” requirement. See Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (noting that, to 
show standing, a plaintiff must show that she “[1] suffered, or [is] threatened with, an actual injury 
[2] traceable to the defendant and [3] likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision” 
(quoting Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 477 (1990)). 
 161. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1164 (2013) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. 
Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010)). 
 162. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992) (quoting United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 163. United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947). 
 164. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2). 
 165. Already, 133 S. Ct. at 726 (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per 
curiam)). 
 166. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (quoting Henry P. 
Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973)). 
 167. Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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remedied is “capable of repetition, [but would] evad[e] review.”169 
Likewise, and as noted above, a class representative with a mooted claim 
may continue to have standing in some circumstances, such as when the 
class action has already been certified.170 
At first glance, there is some support for the view that the class 
attorney, as trustee, satisfies the standing and other justiciability 
requirements of Article III. Most obviously, it is a matter of hornbook trust 
law that the trustee of a trust has standing to sue on behalf of the 
beneficiaries.171 Accordingly, federal courts have followed trust law to 
conclude that a trustee has sufficient Article III standing to sue.172 
This is also true of what can be called judicially created trusts, such as 
the de facto “constructive” trust created by the class action.173 In Hodel v. 
Irving, for example, the Court considered whether a federal statute that 
prevented individuals from disposing certain Sioux tribal lands through 
will or intestacy was considered a “taking” without just compensation in 
violation of the Takings Clause.174 The statutory scheme instead escheated 
the lands to the tribe, and the lands were then consolidated “to ameliorate 
the problem of fractionated ownership of Indian lands.”175 
Three plaintiffs—one an heir to escheated land, the other two devisees 
of the land—challenged the statute.176 However, the plaintiffs were not 
express executors or trustees of the land because “[f]or Indians with trust 
property, statutes require the Secretary of the Interior to assume that 
general role.”177 
                                                                                                                     
 169. Id. 
 170. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975); see also supra Section I.A (discussing this 
precedent). 
 171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 280 (1959) (“The trustee can maintain such actions 
at law or suits in equity or other proceedings against a third person as he could maintain if he held 
the trust property free of trust.”); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a) (noting that “a trustee of an express trust” 
may “sue in their own names without joining the person for whose benefit the action is brought”). 
 172. 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 3531, at 42–43 (3d ed. 2008) (noting cases where, as a matter of standing, “it is the trustee, not 
the debtor or a creditor, who has authority to pursue a particular claim or issue,” but noting that this 
confuses standing law with the substantive law of trusts); see also Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC 
Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 287–88 (2008) (“[F]ederal courts routinely entertain suits which will 
result in relief for parties that are not themselves directly bringing suit. Trustees bring suits to 
benefit their trusts; guardians ad litem bring suits to benefit their wards; receivers bring suit to 
benefit their receiverships; assignees in bankruptcy bring suit to benefit bankrupt estates; executors 
bring suit to benefit testator estates; and so forth.” (emphasis added)). 
 173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. e (2003) (defining a constructive trust, and 
noting that, unlike an express trust, “a constructive trust is imposed, not necessarily to effectuate an 
expressed or implied intention, but to redress a wrong or to prevent unjust enrichment. A 
constructive trust is thus the result of judicial intervention and is remedial in character”). 
 174. 481 U.S. 704, 706, 709 (1987) (discussing § 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act). 
 175. Id. at 709. 
 176. Id. at 709–10. 
 177. Id. at 711; see also 25 U.S.C. § 373a (2012). 
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Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing to 
assert the rights of the decedents to dispose of their land through will or 
intestacy.178 Specifically, the Court noted that the rule preventing parties 
from asserting the rights of third parties is a prudential one, and that the 
rule was not applicable for two reasons. First, although the Secretary of the 
Interior was, by statute, the trustee of the lands at issue, the Secretary was 
also administering the statute being challenged, making him a poor 
advocate for the decedent’s right to pass the property at death.179 Second, 
the plaintiffs would “pursue the claims vigorously” because they were the 
intended beneficiaries of the decedent’s right to pass property at death.180  
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had standing, and 
that “permitting [the plaintiffs] to raise their decedents’ claims is merely an 
extension of the common law’s provision for appointment of a decedent’s 
representative.”181 Indeed, in referencing the common law on appointment 
of a decedent’s representative as supporting standing, the Court implicitly 
blessed the view that judicially appointed trustees can serve as the relevant 
parties for purposes of Article III.182 Accordingly, Hodel provides some 
support for the view that the class attorney, as a judicially appointed trustee 
of the class, can serve as the relevant party for Article III purposes. 
Roper provides additional support. There, the Court concluded that the 
class representatives, who had a mooted claim, had sufficient standing to 
appeal the denial of class certification given “their desire to shift part of the 
costs of litigation to those who will share in its benefits if the class is 
certified and ultimately prevails.”183 Again, the Court emphasized that this 
cost shifting was necessary for the class action to function in the first place, 
because the class action “may motivate [class representatives] to bring 
cases that for economic reasons might not be brought otherwise.”184  
Implicit in this reasoning is the view that, in the absence of the class 
action, no case would be brought given the costs. In other words, the class 
members are incompetent, in the legal sense, to vindicate their own rights 
                                                                                                                     
 178. Id. at 711–12. 
 179. Id. at 711. 
 180. Id. at 712. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Again, judicially appointed administrators of an estate are not trustees. See supra text 
accompanying notes 108–10. But again, “many of the rules applicable to trustees are applicable to 
executors and administrators,” making them functionally similar. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 5(b), § 5 cmt. c (2003) (noting that “representatives of decedents’ estates” are not trusts); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 6 & cmt. a (1959) (providing that “[a]n executorship or an 
administratorship is not a trust,” but noting that both are fiduciaries, and that the primary difference 
between the two is “the tribunals which enforced the duties” of each). 
 183. Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 336–37 (1980). 
 184. Id. at 338. 
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in the absence of the de facto trust created by the class action.185 Indeed, 
even Justice Lewis Powell, who dissented in both Roper and Geraghty, 
which were both decided on the same day, remarked in Geraghty: “After 
certification, the case is no different in principle from more traditional 
representative actions involving, for example, a single party who cannot 
participate himself because of his incompetence but is permitted to litigate 
through an appointed fiduciary.”186  
Here, Justice Powell explicitly identified the link between class actions 
and other actions brought by trustees and similar fiduciaries like 
administrators. All recognize a third party as the relevant party for Article 
III purposes because the beneficiaries of the action cannot adequately 
represent their own interests. They may be deceased, like the decedents in 
Hodel, or they may be unable to coordinate themselves to enforce their 
rights, like the class members in Roper and Geraghty. Thus, the only 
mistake the Court made in Roper and Geraghty was choosing the wrong 
fiduciary. It is the class attorney, not the class representatives, who has the 
proper incentives to protect the rights of the class. 
The Court’s failure to recognize the class attorney as the relevant party 
for Article III purposes was no oversight. In Roper, Justice Powell showed 
the difficulty in recognizing the class attorney as the real party in interest: 
To be sure, respondents’ counsel may have the same interest 
in an enlarged recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee 
arrangement. But I know of no decision by any court that 
holds that a lawyer’s interest in a larger fee, to be paid by 
third persons not present in the court, creates the personal 
stake in the outcome required by Art[icle] III.187 
In fact, Symczyk casts even more doubt on the trust view of the class 
action. The Symczyk majority, in particular, stated in a footnote that Roper 
was in some tension with more recent precedent, noting that “[an] interest 
in attorney’s fees is, of course, insufficient to create an Article III case or 
controversy where none exists on the merits of the underlying claim.”188 
Although Hodel provides some support for recognizing the Article III 
standing of judicially appointed trustees and similar fiduciaries, the class 
attorney unfortunately never has been formally recognized as such a 
fiduciary. Moreover, although Roper provides support for viewing some 
                                                                                                                     
 185. See Kaplan, supra note 30, at 497 (noting that the Rule 23(b)(3) category was primarily 
drafted to vindicate “the rights of groups of people who individually would be without effective 
strength to bring their opponents into court at all”). 
 186. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 415 n.8 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
 187. Roper, 445 U.S. at 353 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 188. See Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. 1523, 1532 n.5 (2013) (quoting 
Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 480 (1990)). 
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features of the class action, such as cost sharing, as providing a sufficient 
personal stake for Article III purposes, the more recent precedent cited by 
Symczyk clearly states that the prospect of attorney’s fees is, “of course, 
insufficient.”189 Consequently, whatever support cases like Hodel and 
Roper provide for the trust view of the class action is unlikely to override 
this more recent precedent. 
B.  Cognizable Injury and Injury in Fact 
The trust view of the class action is, admittedly, a metaphor. But like all 
metaphors, it reveals an important similarity between class actions and 
trust arrangements like the one described in Hodel. In both situations, a 
court recognizes that the claims of the injured parties are only adequately 
protected by allocating control over those claims to a third party. 
Identifying this functional similarity between class actions and trusts 
reveals additional support for the trust view of the class action. But before 
discussing this support, it is important to distinguish between two 
requirements encompassed by the personal injury requirement for Article 
III standing. First, the personal injury must be an “invasion of a legally 
protected interest,”190 which the Court has referred to as a “judicially 
cognizable injury”191 or a “legally cognizable injury.”192 Second, the 
personal injury also requires harm caused by the defendant’s unlawful 
conduct.193 The Court has referred to this as a requirement of an injury in 
fact, the “in fact” terms reflecting that an “actual or imminent” harm is 
required as opposed to one that is “too speculative.”194  
The distinction between a cognizable injury and an injury in fact 
mirrors the distinction between an “injury” and “harm” under tort law. Like 
the law of justiciability, tort law defines an “injury” as “an invasion of a 
legally protected interest.”195 Tort law also distinguishes an “invasion of a 
legally protected interest” from the “harm” it causes.196 
                                                                                                                     
 189. Id. 
 190. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (defining “injury in fact” 
as requiring “an invasion of a legally protected interest”). 
 191. E.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984) (noting that an interest in having the 
government comply with the law is not sufficient to establish a “judicially cognizable injury”). 
 192. E.g., Symczyk, 133 S. Ct. at 1528 (“In order to invoke federal-court jurisdiction, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that he possesses a legally cognizable interest, or personal stake, in the outcome.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997) (noting that, 
for Article III standing purposes, “[w]e have also stressed that the alleged injury must be legally and 
judicially cognizable”). 
 193. Other scholars have noted these two sub-requirements. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury 
and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1915, 1918 (1986) (“Injury analysis demands 
the exploration of not only the directness or actuality of the litigant’s claimed injury, but also the 
judicial cognizability of the interest alleged to be injured.”).  
 194. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). 
 195. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. a (1965). 
 196. Id. (noting that “there may be an injury although no harm is done”). 
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Under both tort law and the law of justiciability, a person can suffer 
harm caused by the defendant’s unlawful conduct without necessarily 
having a legally protected interest violated. For example, the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA) permits an “aggrieved party” to 
challenge an agency action if the action violates federal law.197 The Court 
has noted, however, that a party who has suffered an injury in fact caused 
by an unlawful administrative action may not have standing under the APA 
if the harm was not “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected 
or regulated by the statute.”198 The same is true under tort law.199 
The Supreme Court has generally required both a cognizable injury and 
an injury in fact to satisfy Article III standing. As a result, individuals 
without a cognizable injury cannot assert the rights of those with 
cognizable injuries. The Court has noted that there is a “general prohibition 
on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights.”200 Consequently, the 
law of standing prima facie does not support the trust view of the class 
action because the trust view permits a person with no cognizable injury, 
the class attorney, to assert the rights of those with cognizable injuries. 
However, the Court has noted that the prohibition against third-party 
standing is a “prudential” one “subject to exceptions.”201 In general, the 
Court has permitted third-party standing when it is necessary to adequately 
protect the interests of those with cognizable injuries. In Hodel, for 
example, the Court concluded that the exception to the prohibition against 
third-party standing applied because assigning standing to the intended 
heirs and devisees of the decedents was necessary to ensure the adequate 
representation of the decedents’ rights.202 This exception should apply 
equally to the class action because a third party, the class attorney, is 
assigned control over the class members’ claims in order to adequately 
protect the interests of the class members. 
                                                                                                                     
 197. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). 
 198. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 
2210 (2012) (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970)). 
The Supreme Court has recently held that the zone of interests test is not limited to § 702 claims 
under the APA. Instead, Article III requires the plaintiff’s asserted injury to “fall[] within the zone 
of interests protected by the law invoked.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 
No. 12-873, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2014) (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 
542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)). I would like to thank Suzanna Sherry for her help in disentangling this area 
of standing doctrine. 
 199. RESTATEMENT, supra note 195 (“‘[H]arm’ implies the existence of loss or detriment in 
fact, which may not necessarily be the invasion of a legally protected interest.”). 
 200. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 
(1975) (noting that a party “generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest 
his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties”). 
 201. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 711–12 (1986); see also Lexmark, No. 12-873 slip op. at 
8-9 n.3. (noting that the prohibition against third party standing is a “prudential” one). 
 202. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 711–12.  
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One benefit of this exception to the prohibition against third-party 
standing is that it identifies other cases outside the trust context which, like 
the class action, recognize the standing of third parties without cognizable 
injuries in order to protect the interests of those injured. One such example 
is Craig v. Boren.203 There, the plaintiffs contended that a statutory scheme 
under Oklahoma law violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
“prohibit[ed] the sale of ‘nonintoxicating’ 3.2% beer to males under the 
age of 21 and to females under the age of 18.”204 The plaintiffs included a 
vendor of such beer, and the Supreme Court questioned sua sponte whether 
the vendor could “rely upon the equal protection objections of males 18–20 
years of age to establish her claim of unconstitutionality of the age-sex 
differential.”205  
The Court acknowledged that the vendor suffered a sufficient “injury in 
fact” for standing purposes because she would either “incur[] a direct 
economic injury through the constriction of her buyers’ market,” or suffer 
“sanctions and possible loss of license” for violating the statutory 
scheme.206 However, in considering the standing issue as one of third-
party, or “jus tertii,” standing,207 the Court implicitly concluded that the 
vendor’s harm was not within the zone of interests protected by the Equal 
Protection Clause.208 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the vendor could assert third-
party standing on behalf of the underage males.209 Like in Hodel, the Court 
in Craig v. Boren noted that limitations on jus tertii standing are not 
“constitutionally mandated, but rather stem from a salutary ‘rule of self-
restraint.’”210 The Court then concluded that such limitations did not apply 
given “the impact of the litigation on the third-party interests.”211 
Specifically, the named underage male plaintiff turned twenty-one after the 
Court granted certiorari, effectively mooting his claim.212 Apparently 
mindful of the risk of mootness for any underage male seeking to challenge 
the statutory scheme, the Craig v. Boren Court permitted the third-party 
standing of the vendor, citing precedent permitting parties like the vendor 
to “act[] as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their 
market or function.”213 Indeed, the Court considered the vendor the 
                                                                                                                     
 203. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 204. Id. at 191–92. 
 205. Id. at 192–93. 
 206. Id. at 194. 
 207. Id. at 193–94. 
 208. See id. at 196–97. 
 209. See id. at 194. 
 210. Id. at 193 (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953)). 
 211. Id. at 196 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972)). 
 212. Id. at 192. 
 213. Id. at 195. 
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“obvious claimant” given that the statute prohibited the sale of beer, rather 
than its use.214 
Another example appears in the overbreadth context, where the Court 
has permitted a party to seek to invalidate a statute that violates the First 
Amendment, even though the party’s own speech could “be regulated by a 
statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.”215 As in Craig v. 
Boren, the “overbreadth” plaintiff does not fall within the “zone of 
interests” protected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, as in Craig v. 
Boren, the Court has permitted the overbreadth plaintiff to sue because 
waiting for a plaintiff to violate the statute with protected speech and then 
sue would result in a greater chilling of the First Amendment rights of 
others.216 In fact, the overbroad statute may never be challenged because it 
may chill protected speech completely. As a result, allowing the 
overbreadth plaintiff to sue, rather than those actually injured, better 
protects the First Amendment rights of those who would be harmed by an 
overbroad statute. As in Craig v. Boren, the Court has recognized 
overbreadth plaintiffs’ standing to sue in order to adequately protect the 
free speech rights of others. 
One further similarity between the class attorney and the third-party 
plaintiffs discussed above is that it is too costly for those actually injured to 
bring suit. The relevant cost for the injured parties in Craig v. Boren is 
time. It is far less costly for an injured party to wait until he is twenty-one 
than bring a lawsuit that will most likely endure well after he comes of age. 
Indeed, the Court noted that permitting the vendor’s “representative” 
standing is not all that different from a class action where the “fluid 
membership always included some [males] with live claims.”217 Likewise, 
the overbreadth plaintiff is afforded standing because a lawsuit is too costly 
for a plaintiff who wants to utter protected speech. For such a plaintiff to 
bring a lawsuit, she must violate the unlawful statute, await prosecution, 
and risk incarceration.218 Such a plaintiff would have to be a “lunatic” to 
engage in that activity.219 
                                                                                                                     
 214. Id. at 197. 
 215. See, e.g., Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) (noting that “the Court has 
altered its traditional rules of standing to permit—in the First Amendment area—‘attacks on overly 
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own 
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity’” (quoting 
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965))). 
 216. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503 (1985) (permitting 
overbreadth standing because the challenged statute “also threatens others not before the court—
those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather 
than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid”). 
 217. Craig, 429 U.S. at 194 (alterations in original) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 
117 (1976)). 
 218. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 486–87. 
 219. Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (noting 
that, in small-claims litigation, “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30”). 
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C.  Cognizable Injury and the Right to Bring Suit 
Cases like Hodel and Craig v. Boren differ from the class action in one 
important respect. In both cases the uninjured third-party plaintiffs have at 
least suffered an injury in fact. The heirs and devisees in Hodel lost their 
land. The vendor in Craig v. Boren lost sales. Indeed, the Court noted in 
both Craig v. Boren and Hodel “that such injuries establish the threshold 
requirements of a ‘case or controversy’ mandated by Art[icle] III.”220 
At first glance there appears to be no harm in the overbreadth context 
because the overbreadth plaintiff’s speech could be prohibited under a 
constitutionally valid statute. But some scholars argue that overbreadth 
plaintiffs have suffered an injury in fact because their prosecution is a harm 
caused by an invasion of a legally protected interest—“a personal 
constitutional right not to be subjected to governmental sanctions except 
pursuant to a constitutionally valid rule of law.”221 In fact, recognizing 
such a legally protected interest in constitutionally valid laws suggests that 
the third-party plaintiffs in Hodel and Craig v. Boren were asserting their 
own rights, and not just the rights of others.222 
Unlike the above third-party cases, the class action attorney has not 
suffered any injury in fact. Her interest is only in her potential attorney’s 
fees, “a ‘byproduct’ of the suit itself.”223 As noted by the Court in Symczyk 
and in other cases, such an interest “itself cannot give rise to a cognizable 
injury in fact for Article III standing purposes.”224 Indeed, cases like 
Symczyk cast significant doubt on Roper and Geraghty, which both held 
that the class representative’s interest in the entitlements provided by class 
certification was sufficient for Article III standing purposes.225 
But cases like Roper and Geraghty are not isolated incidents. There is, 
in fact, recent precedent in which the Court explicitly recognized “by-
products” of the litigation as sufficient stakes for Article III standing 
purposes. A clear-cut example is the qui tam provisions of the False 
Claims Act.226 These provisions assign the right to sue and a partial 
beneficial interest to a whistleblower, called a relator, to induce her to 
                                                                                                                     
 220. Craig, 429 U.S. at 194; Hodel, 481 U.S. at 711 (noting that plaintiffs had suffered 
“sufficient injury-in-fact to satisfy Article III of the Constitution”). 
 221. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 
113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1331 (2000) (citing Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 3). 
 222. See Monaghan, supra note 221, at 3 (arguing that overbreadth standing is not third-party 
standing because “[u]nder ‘conventional’ standing principles, a litigant has always had the right to 
be judged in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule of law”). 
 223. Cf. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000) (citing 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) and Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 
(1986)). 
 224. Id. (emphasis added). 
 225. See supra Section II.A. 
 226. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (2012). 
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provide information of possible false claims made against the United 
States.227 Like the third-party plaintiffs discussed above, the relator lacks 
an invasion of a legally protected interest caused by the unlawful conduct 
because it is the right of the United States to be free from false claims that 
is being violated.228 But, like the class attorney, the relator has not suffered 
harm caused by the alleged fraudulent conduct. Her interest “does not even 
fully materialize until the litigation is completed and the relator 
prevails.”229  
Nevertheless, in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States 
ex rel. Stevens, the Court found that a relator had sufficient standing 
because, in other contexts, the Court has recognized that “the assignee of a 
claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.”230 
The Vermont Court, moreover, stressed the “the long tradition of qui tam 
actions in England and the American Colonies.”231 In doing so, the Court 
stressed that “Article III’s restriction of the judicial power to ‘Cases’ and 
‘Controversies’ is properly understood to mean ‘cases and controversies of 
the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial 
process.’”232 
A more extreme example can be found in Sprint Communications Co. 
v. APCC Services, Inc., which involved suits brought by “aggregators” on 
behalf of numerous payphone operators to collect statutory damages from 
long-distance carriers.233 The payphone operators assigned their claims to 
the aggregators via contract, but the aggregators were required under the 
contract to remit any recovery back to the operators.234 The aggregators 
received only a flat fee for their services.235 Nevertheless, the Court 
concluded that the aggregators, as assignees of the “legal title” to the 
claims, had sufficient standing to sue under Article III despite having to 
remit the entire recovery.236 Thus, unlike the class attorney or the qui tam 
                                                                                                                     
 227. Id. § 3730; see also U.S. ex rel. Duxbury v. Ortho Biotech Prods., LP, 579 F.3d 13, 16 
(1st Cir. 2009) (“The qui tam provisions permit whistleblowers (known as relators) to bring certain 
fraud claims on behalf of the United States; in return, ‘[a] private relator is entitled to a portion of 
any proceeds from the suit, whether the United States intervenes as an active participant in the 
action or not.’” (alterations in original & citations omitted)). 
 228. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 772–73 (“A qui tam relator has suffered no 
such invasion—indeed, the ‘right’ he seeks to vindicate does not even fully materialize until the 
litigation is completed and the relator prevails.”). 
 229. See id. (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *437). 
 230. Id. at 773. 
 231. Id. at 774. 
 232. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 
(1998)). 
 233. 554 U.S. 269, 272 (2008). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. at 285–86. 
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relator, such an assignee of legal title would not benefit from any potential 
remedy at all.237 
As in Vermont, the Sprint Court justified this result by relying upon 
historical practice. The Court noted that “history and precedent are clear on 
the question before us: Assignees of a claim, including assignees for 
collection, have long been permitted to bring suit.”238 Indeed, even Chief 
Justice John Robert’s dissent in Sprint acknowledged that “suits by 
trustees, guardians ad litem, executors, and the like make up a settled, 
continuous practice ‘of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, 
the judicial process,’” and thus pose no justiciability problems.239 
Both Vermont and Sprint provide support for the trust view of the class 
action. Both cases involved parties like the class attorney whose only 
interest in the litigation was an assignment of the legal title to the claims of 
the injured. But, unlike the third-party cases discussed earlier, the Court 
relied upon historical practice to support such standing. Arguably, such a 
historical argument could be made in support of the class action, 
particularly given the class action’s history as a procedure of equity, a 
context in which the modern trust also arose.240  
However, such a historical argument would differ from the functional 
justification that underlies both the trust view of the class action and the 
use of third-party standing in cases like Hodel, Craig v. Boren, and the 
overbreadth cases. Again, according to that functional justification, third-
party standing is permitted when it is necessary to adequately protect the 
interests of injured individuals. That functional justification tied the trust 
view of the class action to the permissible uses of third-party standing 
under the law of justiciability. In contrast, using historical practice 
provides no such ties. 
But the same functional argument can be made to support the use of 
byproduct standing found in the qui tam context and in contract cases like 
Sprint. The key is to recognize that a legally protected interest does not 
automatically include a right to bring a lawsuit to protect that interest.  
The law of Article III standing generally presumes that “a legally 
protected interest” includes a concomitant right to enforce that interest by 
filing a lawsuit in court. The requirement of a “judicially cognizable 
injury,” for example, is just another way of saying that an injury is required 
that is “[c]apable of being judicially tried or examined before a designated 
                                                                                                                     
 237. See id. at 301 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“When you got nothing, you got nothing to lose.” 
(quoting BOB DYLAN, Like a Rolling Stone, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (Columbia Records 1965))). 
 238. Id. at 275. 
 239. See id. at 304–05 n.2 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)). 
 240. I am exploring this historical relationship in more detail in a separate article. See Campos, 
Trust, supra note 25. For an account of the history of the class action and its origins in equity, see 
generally STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION 
(1987). 
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tribunal.”241 Similarly, the Court has referred to the “zone of interest test,” 
which applies to challenges of administrative action under § 702 of the 
APA, as “a guide for deciding whether, in view of Congress’ evident intent 
to make agency action presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff 
should be heard to complain of a particular agency decision.”242 In fact, tort 
law itself defines an “injury” as an “invasion of a legally protected interest” 
that “would entitle the person suffering the invasion to maintain an action 
of tort.”243 
For most of the rights addressed by the Court, the right is protected by 
what Professor Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed have referred to 
as a “liability rule,” which, in effect, gives another party an option to take 
the legal entitlement “if he is willing to pay an objectively determined 
value for it.”244 A liability rule protects a legal entitlement by giving the 
victim a right to bring an action to collect the payment associated with the 
taking, which is usually defined as the actual damages suffered by the 
victim. By giving the victim a right to bring an action for damages for any 
invasion of her legal entitlement, a potential injurer is deterred from taking 
the entitlement unless she is willing to pay damages for it.245 Thus, it is 
understandable that the Court has presumed that a “legally protected 
interest” includes a right to bring suit, because the Court, like all courts, 
generally deals with liability rules.246 
But a “legally protected interest” may be protected by something other 
than a liability rule. As most famously recognized by Calabresi and 
Melamed, a government not only “has to decide whom to entitle,” but also 
must decide “the manner in which [those] entitlements are protected.”247 
For example, the federal government may create a legal entitlement to 
reasonably safe pharmaceuticals, but protect it by barring the sale of any 
drug unless it has been subjected to intensive pre-market testing for 
                                                                                                                     
 241. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 295 (9th ed. 2010) (defining “cognizable”). 
 242. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. a (1965). 
 244. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090–92 (1972) (defining a 
liability rule); see also IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 5 
(2005) (arguing that liability rules create options that allow other parties to take a legal entitlement 
if they agree to pay a price). 
 245. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation for Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 
357, 357 (1984) (noting that liability rules protect legal entitlements “indirectly, through the 
deterrent effect of damage actions that may be brought once harm occurs”). 
 246. Property rules, which protect an entitlement absolutely, are also generally enforced 
through private rights of actions, where the remedy is an injunction rather than damages. See 
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 244, at 1115–16 (discussing pollution). For the sake of clarity, 
this Article will refer to all rules which protect entitlements through private rights of action as 
“liability rules.” 
 247. Id. at 1090–92. 
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safety.248 By using ex ante regulation, the federal government legally 
protects an interest in safety without the need to provide a right to bring an 
action.249  
A legally protected interest also may be protected by a liability rule, but 
the rule may limit who can bring a lawsuit. For example, a court may 
empower only a subset of victims. In the antitrust context, only “direct 
purchasers” can bring suit because doing so avoids the complexity 
involved in determining damages for plaintiffs with indirect invasions of 
their legally protected interests.250 
Most importantly, a liability rule may only adequately protect the 
interests of those injured by permitting a party to sue who lacks any injury 
or harm altogether. For example, in the class action context, judicial 
assignment of the legal title of the class members’ claims to the class 
attorney is necessary to adequately protect the members’ interest in the 
claims.251 
But this is also true in both the qui tam context and in Sprint. In the qui 
tam context, a relator is assigned both the legal title and a partial beneficial 
interest to the United States’ fraud claim because the relator is in the best 
position to identify fraud against the United States. Because, by its nature, 
fraud is concealed from the defrauded, it makes sense to provide a 
“bounty” to induce an insider to come forward with knowledge of the 
fraud.252 This is similar to the function of the “bounty” in the class action 
context, which incentivizes the class attorney to invest in discovery to 
gather information that the class members cannot gather on their own due 
to collective action problems. 253 Consequently, and similar to the class 
                                                                                                                     
 248. See Shavell, supra note 245, at 357 (1984) (describing “liability for harm” and 
“regulation for safety” as “two very different approaches for controlling activities that create risks of 
harm to others”); cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 244, at 1092–93 (describing an 
“inalienability rule” as a rule that protects a legal entitlement by “forbid[ding] its sale under some or 
all circumstances”). 
 249. Cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 581 (2009) (concluding that state law tort claims were 
not preempted by ex ante regulatory scheme of FDA). 
 250. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746–47 (1977) (holding that only direct 
purchasers have standing to sue for violations of the federal antitrust laws to avoid complexities of 
determining downstream damages for indirect purchasers). Although antitrust law is governed by 
statute, courts have also limited standing to a subset of injured parties in the context of common law 
rights. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 979–80 (E.D. Va. 1981) (only 
permitting some plaintiffs to sue in tort for economic losses caused by the defendant’s alleged 
pollution of a river to avoid “double-counting” and “other complexities”). 
 251. See supra Part I. 
 252. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 775 (2000) (noting 
that the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act arose from English actions “that allowed 
informers to obtain a portion of the penalty as a bounty for their information”). 
 253. See MARTIN H. REDISH, WHOLESALE JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE 
PROBLEM OF THE CLASS ACTION LAWSUIT 35 (2009) (calling a class action that does not provide 
compensation for most of the class a “disguised bounty hunter action”); see also id. at 26–27 
(analogizing such class actions to “qui tam” actions in which a noninjured third party asserts claims 
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action, standing is provided to the relator because the United States would 
not otherwise be able to protect itself against the best concealed fraudulent 
acts.254  
The contract at issue in Sprint is even more analogous to the class 
action. The Sprint Court noted that the numerous payphone operators 
assigned the legal title of their statutory claims to the aggregators 
“[b]ecause litigation is expensive, because the evidentiary demands of a 
single suit are often great, and because the resulting monetary recovery is 
often small.”255 In other words, the payphone operators lacked the 
incentive to bring suit individually, and thus assigned the legal title to their 
claims to the aggregator because the aggregator could use cost sharing and 
economies of scale to vindicate their claims. Accordingly, the assignment 
contract in Sprint mimicked a small-claims class action.256 
Finally, the functional similarity of the class action to qui tam actions 
and Sprint can be used to distinguish class actions from the precedent 
prohibiting the standing of parties with only an interest in a byproduct of 
the litigation. The foundation for this precedent is Diamond v. Charles, 
which concerned a challenge to the constitutionality of an Illinois statute 
that restricted abortion.257 At issue was the party status of a conscientious 
                                                                                                                     
belonging to the victim, although, unlike qui tam actions, “class action bounty actions” have not 
“been explicitly authorized by congressional statute”). 
 254. See supra notes 226–29 and accompanying text. 
 255. Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 271 (2008).  
 256. In fact, the contract in Sprint differs from the class action only in one deeply ironic sense. 
Unlike the class attorney, the aggregators in Sprint did not receive a portion of any recovery. But, as 
noted by Professor Samuel Issacharoff, this may be so only because  
[i]n order to be eligible for assignment of a contingent interest, a firm such as 
APCC Services would have to be a law firm. Otherwise, a private firm funding 
someone else’s litigation and reserving an interest in the outcome could run afoul 
of traditional common law prohibitions on maintenance and champerty, which bar 
nonlitigants from funding litigation in exchange for an equity stake in the 
outcome. 
Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 190 (footnotes 
omitted). Thus, the contract at issue in Sprint does not completely mimic the class action because it 
would be unlawful to do so. 
 257. 476 U.S. 54, 56 (1986). In fact, the case cited by the Symczyk Court, Lewis v. Continental 
Bank Corp., cited Diamond v. Charles for the proposition that an “interest in attorney’s fees is, of 
course, insufficient to create an Article III case or controversy where none exists on the merits of 
the underlying claim” without any further discussion. Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 
480 (1990). Likewise, in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, the Court cited Lewis for 
the same proposition with no further discussion. See 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998). 
One could also distinguish Lewis v. Continental and Steel Co. along functional lines. In Lewis 
v. Continental, the plaintiff Continental’s case became moot, and its only remaining interest, apart 
from recovering attorneys’ fees, was in potentially filing a future application. Lewis, 494 U.S. at 
480. In Steel Co. the plaintiff sought the disclosure of documents that were ultimately disclosed 
during the pendency of the litigation, and none of the requested relief would have redressed the 
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objector to abortion who sought to intervene as a defendant based on his 
objections, as well as “his status as a pediatrician and as a parent of an 
unemancipated minor daughter.”258 The plaintiffs won their suit, and after 
Illinois declined to appeal, the objector sought to appeal the judgment as 
“the sole appellant.”259 
The Court concluded that the objector lacked standing for two reasons. 
First, the Court noted that the law of Article III standing “reflects a due 
regard for the autonomy of those most likely to be affected by a judicial 
decision.”260 Thus, allowing the objector to appeal after the state accepted 
the district court’s judgment would, in effect, permit the objector “to 
compel the State to enact a code in accord with Diamond’s interests.”261 
Second, the Court noted that the objector’s interests as a doctor, a father of 
a daughter, and a citizen concerned with the lives of fetuses were not 
sufficient because he did not identify any “injury-in-fact” and did not 
identify himself as “a proper person” to represent any of those interests.262 
In particular, as to his interest as a doctor, the Court noted that the objector 
had not shown that the law had such “a direct financial impact on his 
practice” that he could “assert the constitutional rights of other individuals 
who are unable to assert those rights themselves.”263 
Admittedly, the Court made clear that the objector’s liability for 
attorneys’ fees was insufficient to confer Article III standing because it 
lacked “a nexus to the substantive character of the statute or regulation at 
issue.”264 However, read in the context of the entire opinion, the Court 
made clear that there was no need to give the objector standing to protect 
the interests of the others he purportedly represented. In fact, to recognize 
his standing would undermine the interests of Illinois, one of the parties he 
sought to represent. Accordingly, the Diamond v. Charles Court arguably 
concluded that a byproduct of the litigation is an insufficient interest for 
Article III standing purposes when such a byproduct is not necessary to 
adequately protect the interests of those injured. It should therefore not 
apply to cases in the class action, qui tam, and contract contexts. 
                                                                                                                     
plaintiff for the harm caused by the late disclosure. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 105–09. In both cases 
there was no indication that permitting standing solely on the basis of an interest in attorneys’ fees 
was necessary to adequately protect the interests of those injured. In fact, the plaintiffs in both cases 
could have cured their standing defects with minimal effort, either by actually filing an application 
or seeking compensatory relief. 
 258. Diamond, 476 U.S. at 57–58. 
 259. Id. at 61. 
 260. Id. at 62. 
 261. Id. at 65. 
 262. Id. at 65–67. 
 263. Id. at 65–66. 
 264. Id. at 70. 
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Figure 1 – Injury-in-Fact, Legally 












Legal Title (e.g., 
qui tam, class 
attorney) 







D.  “Hohfeldian” and “Non-Hohfeldian” Plaintiffs 
To conclude, the personal injury requirement can be understood to 
encompass at least three separate requirements. Traditionally, a personal 
injury includes (1) an injury in fact (2) that constitutes an invasion of a 
legally protected interest (3) that further entitles the party to bring a 
lawsuit. Parties who satisfy all three requirements can be understood as 
“Hohfeldian plaintiffs,” or plaintiffs whose “personal and proprietary 
interests” have been violated, which, in turn, entitles them to bring a 
lawsuit.265 
 
                                                                                                                     
 265. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 n.5 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (defining a 
“Hohfeldian plaintiff”). Justice Harlan borrowed the term from Professor Louis L. Jaffe. Id. For 
Jaffe’s own discussion of “Hohfeldian plaintiffs,” see Jaffe, supra note 13, at 1033. 
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These three separate requirements, however, are not necessary in some 
contexts, as discussed in the previous sections and as shown in Figure 1 
above. The left side of Figure 1 shows the three different requirements 
encompassed by the personal injury requirement of Article III standing. 
The right side of Figure 1 shows the different types of plaintiffs discussed 
in this Part and which of the three separate requirements these plaintiffs 
satisfy. Plaintiffs who do not satisfy all three of the personal injury 
requirements could be understood as “Non-Hohfeldian” plaintiffs. 
However, Non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs generally have been limited to 
plaintiffs who are “bereft of any personal or proprietary coloration” and 
seek only “to vindicate public rights.”266 The closest analogue to the Non-
Hohfeldian plaintiff is the assignee of legal title over the claim, who also 
lacks any personal or proprietary stake in the litigation other than those 
stakes created by the litigation itself. 
Figure 1, in fact, calls into question the usefulness of distinguishing 
between Hohfeldian and Non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs in the conventional 
way because it shows that plaintiffs may exist somewhere in between. Jus 
tertii plaintiffs like the vendor in Craig v. Boren, for example, have 
suffered an injury in fact, which gives them a personal interest in the 
litigation, even if it is not legally recognized. In fact, and as reflected by the 
dashed arrows in Figure 1, both jus tertii plaintiffs and overbreadth 
plaintiffs arguably can be understood as Hohfeldian plaintiffs to the extent 
that they have a legally protected interest “not to be subjected to 
governmental sanctions except pursuant to a constitutionally valid rule of 
law.”267 
The better approach is to tease out the different requirements embodied 
by the “personal injury” requirement and then analyze whether, despite a 
missing requirement, a federal court should nevertheless recognize 
standing based on the objectives of the law of justiciability. Of course, to 
apply such an approach to the “personal injury” requirement requires an 
understanding of these objectives, which are addressed in the next Part. 
III.  THE FUNCTION OF THE LAW OF JUSTICIABILITY 
To recap, Part I set forth and defended a trust view of the class action, 
one which considers the class attorney the real party in interest.268 Part II 
argued that the trust view of the class action can be seen as consistent with 
the law of justiciability under Article III.269 This is because the law of 
justiciability permits the standing of uninjured, even unharmed, plaintiffs 
like the class attorney if doing so is necessary to adequately protect the 
interests of those injured. Thus, Part II showed that the class action is 
                                                                                                                     
 266. Flast, 392 U.S. at 119 n.5. 
 267. Fallon, supra note 221, at 1331. 
 268. See supra Part I. 
 269. See supra Part II. 
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functionally similar to cases in the jus tertii, overbreadth, and qui tam 
contexts.270  
This Part explores more broadly the underlying objectives of the law of 
justiciability. It first argues that the exceptions discussed in Part II prove 
the rule. In other words, it takes a functional approach to the law of 
justiciability,271 and argues that the core function of the law of justiciability 
is to adequately protect the interests of those not before the court. As 
argued in more detail below, this representational function encompasses 
both of the stated purposes of the law of justiciability articulated by the 
Supreme Court: (1) to assure that “concrete adverseness which sharpens 
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for 
illumination”272 and (2) to maintain the “tripartite allocation of power” set 
forth in the Constitution.273 
The Part then examines what, if anything, the law of justiciability can 
learn from the trust view of the class action. The central lesson of the trust 
view of the class action is that those actually injured cannot always 
adequately represent their own interests in court. This Part uses this lesson 
to address the adverseness and separation of powers concerns of the Court. 
This exploration of the function of the law of justiciability is not meant 
to provide a comprehensive theory of Article III justiciability.274 Instead, 
this Article’s goal is only to outline a functional framework for 
understanding the law of justiciability, which suggests a number of ways to 
improve the existing law. 
A.  Adequacy of Representation 
Many scholars have noted the similarities between class action law and 
the law of justiciability.275 Specifically, scholars have noted that both are 
concerned with ensuring that the party before the court will adequately 
                                                                                                                     
 270. See supra Sections II.B–C. 
 271. This is a common approach taken by a number of scholars. E.g., Heather Elliott, The 
Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 460–61 (2008) (stating that “[i]n this Article, I seek 
to understand what separation-of-powers functions are served by standing doctrine,” among other 
things (footnote omitted)); Kontorovich, supra note 31, at 1664 (stating that “[t]his Article explains 
two related functions served by the standing doctrine in public law”); Siegel, supra note 11, at 117 
(noting that his arguments are “based on the structural or functional role that justiciability 
constraints play”). 
 272. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2680 (2013) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 204 (1962)). 
 273. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)). 
 274. For an example of a more comprehensive account of the law of justiciability, see Siegel, 
supra note 11. 
 275. Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 307–09; Kontorovich, supra note 31, at 1724; Scott, supra 
note 31, at 675. 
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represent the interests of the nonparties who will be affected by the court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction.276  
One of the first to notice this due process similarity was Professor Lea 
Brilmayer, who particularly focused on “the fairness problems that would 
arise if an ideological challenger—a challenger without the traditional 
personal stake—were permitted to litigate a constitutional claim.”277 
Professor Brilmayer pointed out that, just as the preclusive effect of a class 
action may impair an absent class member’s claim, an ideological plaintiff 
may impair a nonparty’s constitutional rights through the precedent created 
by the ideological plaintiff’s action.278 Furthermore, an ideological plaintiff 
may impact some nonparties’ constitutional rights directly by seeking an 
injunction, which would apply to those nonparties regardless of their party 
status before the court.279 In fact, Professor Eugene Kontorovich has 
argued that, in the absence of standing restrictions, any plaintiff may bring 
a constitutional claim to extract payments or other concessions from others 
affected by the claim, making everyone worse off.280  
This Article goes further to argue that adequacy of representation is the 
guiding principle of Article III’s justiciability requirements. This is 
particularly true of actions involving constitutional issues, which have been 
the focus of Professor Brilmayer, Professor Kontorovich, and other 
scholars, and which have presented the Supreme Court with most difficult 
questions of justiciability.281  
                                                                                                                     
 276. Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 307; Kontorovich, supra note 31, at 1724–25; Scott, supra 
note 31, at 675. 
 277. Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 306; see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 
§ 2.1, at 46 (5th ed. 2007) (“[T]he justiciability doctrines also promote fairness, especially to 
individuals who are not litigants before the court.”). 
 278. Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 307; see also Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1099 
(noting that the law of procedural due process in the class action context identifies “the preclusive 
effect of any judgment on the claims of the absent class members” as the relevant deprivation for 
due process purposes). 
 279. See Bronsteen & Fiss, supra note 7, at 1433 (“[W]hen the named plaintiff seeks an 
injunction, as in the typical school desegregation case, it is not even clear what is to be gained for 
him or the class by casting the suit in terms of a class action. If the named plaintiff brings suit 
individually and wins, then the defendant will be bound to act in a way that confers benefits on the 
entire class—to desegregate the schools—and that obligation can easily be enforced by all the 
members of the class.”). 
 280. Kontorovich, supra note 31, at 1683 (“Broad standing presents the holdout problem on a 
massive scale.”). 
 281. This conclusion is similar to the argument made by Professor Aziz Huq that “a central 
principle of Article III” is to “sort out cases and controversies that can be resolved without large 
spillover effects on third parties who are unrepresented in the courtroom.” Aziz Z. Huq, Standing 
for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1464 (2013). However, this Article does not 
argue that courts should avoid cases with large spillover effects, in part because trying to eliminate 
such cases would be futile, a point that Huq concedes. See id. at 1470. More importantly, and as 
discussed in Section III.C, eliminating cases with large spillover effects may be undesirable in some 
circumstances. 
48
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss2/1
2014] CLASS ACTIONS AND JUSTICIABILITY 601 
 
For example, the Court has repeatedly stated: “At bottom, ‘the gist of 
the question of standing’ is whether petitioners have ‘such a personal stake 
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness 
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely 
depends for illumination.’”282 But why does a federal court require 
illumination in the first place? One obvious answer is that such 
illumination is helpful in resolving the dispute before it. 
In its older decisions, however, the Court has stressed the importance of 
adversity as “a safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process, 
and one which we have held to be indispensable to adjudication of 
constitutional questions by this Court.”283 This concern with the “integrity 
of the judicial process” can only be understood as a concern with ensuring 
the adequate resolution of constitutional issues for the benefit of those not 
before the court. Indeed, it is fairly well recognized by both current 
members of the Court and scholars that the precedents the Court creates by 
adjudicating adverse disputes “are not merely the property of private 
litigants,” but are “valuable to the legal community as a whole.”284 
The reference to the “public” value of a federal court’s exercise of 
jurisdiction does not mean that the nonparty beneficiaries of those 
precedents are amorphous or inchoate.285 Admittedly, a court’s decision on 
a constitutional issue affects many nonparties, including some that “may 
not even be born yet.”286 Nevertheless, nonparties are, in fact, discrete 
persons, who differ from the parties before the federal court only because 
of the mootness or lack of ripeness of their respective claims.  
For example, one may lack a ripe claim to challenge a given statute on 
First Amendment grounds. However, that does not mean one is personally 
unaffected by a federal court’s decision regarding a First Amendment 
challenge to that statute. Of course, if the decision is made at the district 
court level, it may not impair the individual’s First Amendment rights at 
all. She may live in a different district, where the courts may not find the 
                                                                                                                     
 282. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
204 (1962)); see also Siegel, supra note 11, at 87 & n.86 (“Cases using this quotation to support the 
‘litigation-enhancing’ theory of justiciability are legion.”). 
 283. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 505 (1961) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 
Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943)). 
 284. U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994) (Scalia, J.) 
(permitting vacatur of judgment on appeal as moot because of a settlement between the parties only 
when “the public interest would be served by a vacatur” (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki 
Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting))); see also Siegel, 
supra note 11, at 92 (noting that “the problem of interested parties who find their rights affected by 
litigation brought by others is simply intrinsic to our legal system”). 
 285. See Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 312–13 (arguing against a view of “societal interest” that 
is a “ghostly entity” set “apart from the needs of particular people”). 
 286. Id. at 308; cf. Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 969–70 
(1993) (noting “the simple fact that structural injunctions affect countless people, indeed the entire 
public”). 
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decision persuasive authority.287 However, if the Supreme Court makes a 
decision, then that precedent likely will impact future statutes, which may 
result in further infringements on one’s First Amendment rights. Thus, to 
borrow the words of Professor Arthur Miller, “Supreme Court 
decisions . . . are de facto class actions—with the class being the entire 
nation.”288  
Federal courts recognize the reality of the concrete, personal impact a 
federal court decision may have, particularly when the court decides a 
constitutional issue. For example, and as noted by Professor Brilmayer, 
federal courts permit a nonparty to intervene because of the nonparty’s 
interest in the court’s constitutional interpretation, which would not 
preclude the party but would apply to her as a matter of stare decisis.289 
Consequently, the Court’s insistence on the “‘honest and actual 
antagonistic assertion of rights’ to be adjudicated”290 reflects an implicit 
conclusion about who would be the most effective representative of all 
those affected. In the Court’s view, the best representative would be one 
who satisfies the standing requirements—a person with “a ‘personal injury 
fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to 
be redressed by the requested relief.’”291 For example, if a noninjured party 
is simply a bystander propped up by the opposing side to get a favorable 
decision from a federal court, then “the public interest has been placed at 
hazard.”292  
Moreover, the conclusion that only those with an injury in fact should 
have standing explains why the Court has insisted that “relief from the 
injury must be ‘likely’ to follow from a favorable decision.”293 If the party 
                                                                                                                     
 287. See, e.g., Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 578 F.3d 569, 573 (7th Cir. 2009) (denying 
intervention of a party who would be affected by the stare decisis effect of a district court judgment 
because “the decision of a district court has no authority as precedent”). 
 288. Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 
389, 399 (1987). 
 289. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(2) (allowing a nonparty to intervene as of right if she “claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and is so situated that 
disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its 
interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest”); cf. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United 
States, 379 F.2d 818, 829 (5th Cir. 1967) (permitting intervention of a party claiming an interest in 
the stare decisis effect of the appeals court’s interpretation of a federal statute); see also Brilmayer, 
supra note 13, at 307 & n.35 (discussing Atlantis Development Corp.). 
 290. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 505 (1961) (citations omitted). 
 291. Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 
U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 292. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (concluding that a party paid to 
appear by the opposing party did not have standing to sue). 
 293. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)) (defining redressability requirement). 
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will gain nothing from the lawsuit, then it is unlikely that the party will 
invest sufficient time and resources to develop its case before the court.294 
Recently, the Court has not emphasized the importance of the 
justiciability requirements in ensuring the “‘honest and actual antagonistic 
assertion of rights’ to be adjudicated.”295 Instead, the Court has stressed the 
importance of the law of justiciability in maintaining “the judiciary’s 
proper role in our system of government.”296 For example, the Court has 
recently emphasized that “[t]he law of Article III standing . . . is built on 
separation-of-powers principles,” and “serves to prevent the judicial 
process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches.”297 
But the separation of powers concerns of justiciability can also be 
understood as a concern with adequacy of representation. These concerns 
address whether the exercise of federal court jurisdiction undermines the 
operation of our tripartite government in a way that adversely impacts 
others. 
Admittedly, the Constitution binds the federal courts as the “supreme 
Law of the Land.”298 Thus, separation of powers principles limit a federal 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction regardless of the whether the case adversely 
impacts nonparty interests. But the Constitution is also a document 
designed to “promote the general Welfare,”299 and presumably the 
“tripartite allocation of power” set forth in the Constitution was designed 
to adequately protect the interests of all citizens.300 Accordingly, any case 
that undermines the separation of powers would be not only unlawful, but 
detrimental to those not before the court. 
                                                                                                                     
 294. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (requiring a “personal stake” so “as to assure 
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely 
depends for illumination of constitutional questions”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 277, § 2.1, at 46 
(“Because federal courts have limited ability to conduct independent investigations, they just 
depend on the parties to fully present all relevant information to them. It is thought that adverse 
parties, with a stake in the outcome of the litigation, will perform this task best.”). 
 295. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (quoting Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. 
v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892); see also Siegel, supra note 11, at 95 (“In its more recent 
opinions, the Supreme Court has given less attention to the instrumental view that the justiciability 
requirements, by ensuring vigorous litigation, serve to help courts in their quest to reach sound 
decisions.”). 
 296. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) (quoting DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006)). 
 297. Id. 
 298. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (setting forth the “Supremacy Clause”). 
 299. U.S. CONST. pmbl.; see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970) (concluding 
that state welfare recipients were entitled to a hearing prior to termination of benefits under the Due 
Process Clause because “[p]ublic assistance . . . is not mere charity, but a means to ‘promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity’”). 
 300. United States v. Bond, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“[I]ndividuals, too, are protected by 
the operations of separation of powers and checks and balances . . . .”); Valley Forge Christian Coll. 
v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (quoting Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)) (noting this function of justiciability). 
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For example, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that persons who 
have only an “undifferentiated” interest “common to all members of the 
public” lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of a law or 
executive action.301 The Court, in particular, has expressed a concern that 
such “generalized grievances” would undermine the Executive Branch’s 
discretion to enforce federal laws under the Take Care Clause of the 
Constitution.302  
Such a conclusion arises from the implicit premise that the political 
procedures promulgated in the Constitution, which include the election of 
representatives in Congress and the President, are designed to adequately 
protect the “generalized” interests of citizens. In other words, “generalized 
grievances” are “more appropriately addressed in the representative 
branches.”303 These generalized grievances include not only grievances 
against the laws Congress ultimately passes, but also the enforcement of 
those laws provided by the Executive Branch.  
Accordingly, to permit an individual to challenge the level of 
enforcement provided by the Executive Branch would “remove the matter 
from the political process and place it in the courts.”304 In contrast, if a 
person satisfies the standing requirements, then that person transforms 
from an ordinary citizen with an interest in law enforcement into a unique 
citizen whose individual rights have been violated. Consequently, a federal 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate when the standing 
requirements are met because the majoritarian political processes outlined 
in the Constitution cannot adequately protect the rights of an injured 
individual. Indeed, judicial intervention is appropriate because a federal 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction is designed precisely to “protect[] 
individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority.”305  
Another example is the political question doctrine, which denies a 
federal court jurisdiction altogether when there is “a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
                                                                                                                     
 301. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 302. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 761 (1984) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3). 
 303. Id. at 751; see also Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 636 
(2007) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that “generalized grievances affecting the public at large have 
their remedy in the political process”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (“Vindicating the public interest 
(including the public interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the 
function of Congress and the Chief Executive.”); Huq, supra note 281, at 1469 (discussing Lujan, 
and noting that “[a] straitened version of injury in fact, in short, conduces to the appropriate 
allocation of institutional responsibilities”). 
 304. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of 
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983). 
 305. Id. 
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for resolving it.”306 One function of the political question doctrine is to 
prohibit a federal court’s jurisdiction when the issue is dependent on the 
political choices of the governed, rather than the mandates of the 
Constitution.307 Because, again, both the Executive Branch and Congress 
are designed to take into account the preferences of the electorate, they are 
appropriately tasked to address such questions rather than the Judicial 
Branch, which is designed to address only mandatory issues of law.308 
Thus, allowing judicial intervention for such political questions would 
adversely affect the majority because it would frustrate the procedures of 
the Constitution designed to adequately protect the popular will. 
The discussion so far has only argued that adequacy of representation 
provides a coherent, functional framework for understanding the stated 
justifications for the various justiciability requirements. This Article has 
not addressed the efficacy of those requirements given this representational 
function. Indeed, many of the flaws of the current law of justiciability are 
obvious. But one benefit of identifying a coherent, functional account for 
the law of justiciability is that this account can provide guidance on what 
reforms, if any, should be made to the law. The next two sections address 
the current law of justiciability in light of its representational function. In 
particular, these sections use the lessons of the trust view of the class 
action to evaluate current doctrine and to suggest reforms. 
B.  Incentives to Litigate 
As noted above, the standing requirements purportedly are designed “to 
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues 
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination.”309 However, 
whether the standing requirements do, in fact, ensure that the parties before 
a federal court are sufficiently incentivized to “sharpen[] the presentation 
of issues” is worth further investigation. 
The standing requirements ensure that parties have sufficient incentives 
to develop the case by limiting standing to those who have suffered a 
“concrete and particularized” injury which “affect[s] the plaintiff in a 
                                                                                                                     
 306. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
 307. See Siegel, supra note 11, at 95; see also Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question 
Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L.J. 1457, 1458 (2005) (arguing that “[under] the political 
question doctrine . . . courts should abstain from resolving constitutional issues that are better left to 
other departments of government, mainly the national political branches”). 
 308. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) (discussing limitations on the 
issuance of a writ of mandamus, which is inappropriate if the conduct the plaintiff seeks to mandate 
is within the discretion of the defendant); see also Siegel, supra note 11, at 125 (noting that “[t]he 
critical constraint on judicial interference with democracy” is that courts only review the “legality” 
of governmental action). 
 309. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
204 (1962)). 
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personal and individual way.”310 This is in contrast to an individual who 
only has an “undifferentiated” interest in the challenged law that is 
“common to all members of the public.”311 In the Court’s view, limiting 
standing to those individuals who have idiosyncratic injuries would result 
in parties idiosyncratically motivated to develop the facts and law 
necessary for a court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction.312 
Some scholars, such as Professors Brilmayer and Kontorovich, defend 
the concrete and particularized injury requirement as a mechanism to keep 
those with “generalized grievances” from inadequately protecting the rights 
of those actually injured.313 Nevertheless, scholars have heavily criticized 
the concrete and individualized injury requirement for justiciability. 
Specifically, numerous scholars have noted that the requirement does not 
permit ideological organizations to bring claims, even though such 
organizations are often better motivated and financed to develop the case 
than any individually injured party.314 Accordingly, many scholars argue 
that the idea that “the law of standing can be used to assure the competent 
presentation of cases. . . . deserves a quiet burial.”315 
The trust view of the class action, buttressed by the precedent 
permitting uninjured third-party plaintiffs, suggests that ideological 
organizational plaintiffs should, at the very least, be an exception to the 
concrete and individualized injury requirement. Like the class attorney, the 
organization can be understood as a “trustee” that can use economies of 
scale to invest in common issues for the benefit of all persons with an 
interest in those issues. Moreover, like the class attorney, the ideological 
organization not only has a stake in a common issue that dwarfs any 
                                                                                                                     
 310. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992) (citing cases). 
 311. Id. at 575. 
 312. There have been exceptions. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 23–24 (1998) (noting that a 
“widely shared” interest can constitute “injury in fact” if it is not “abstract”). 
 313. Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 306 (noting effect of ideological plaintiff on rights of those 
injured); Kontorovich, supra note 31, at 1683 (noting that “[b]road standing presents the holdout 
problem on a massive scale”). 
 314. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, Standing and Spending—The Role of Legal and Equitable 
Principles, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 47 (2001) (noting that ideological plaintiffs have sufficient 
motivation to develop constitutional issues “precisely because they care as much about the structure 
of American government independent of the impact on their own pocketbooks”); Jaffe, supra note 
13, at 1038 (noting that “investing money in a lawsuit from which one is to acquire no further 
monetary profit argues . . . [for] a quite exceptional kind of interest” that is sufficient for standing 
purposes); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Anticipatory Adjudication, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 718 (1994) (contending that ideological parties “have both the desire and 
resources to mount a vigorous defense of their position”); Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of 
Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1706 (1980) (arguing for a 
“barebones” approach that would permit ideological parties, and that “would insist only on real 
adversity between plaintiff and defendant, and a plaintiff capable of generating a reasonably good, 
‘concrete’ record for decision”).  
 315. Kenneth Culp Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 450, 470 
(1970); see also Siegel, supra note 11, at 90 (same, quoting Davis, supra). 
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interest of its members (and nonmembers), the organization’s very reason 
for existence demonstrates that it has an interest that is consistent with the 
interest of all parties who share the organization’s goals. Finally, like the 
class attorney, the ideological organization can spread common costs by, in 
effect, taxing its members to fund the litigation of the constitutional issue, 
and thus avoid the suboptimal investment that would come with others 
free-riding on the organization’s efforts.  
Consequently, the ideological organization fits comfortably within the 
class of recognized exceptions to the concrete and individualized injury 
requirement. Indeed, the Court has noted that an association has standing 
to sue as long as “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in 
their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the 
organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief 
requested requires the participation of individual members in the 
lawsuit.”316 
But the class action’s trust function reveals a more thoroughgoing flaw 
with the concrete and particularized injury requirement. In the small-claims 
context, for example, no individual has an interest in litigating the case 
before the court. The trust function of the class action solves this problem 
of insufficient incentives by, in effect, forcing the plaintiffs to share the 
costs of a joint benefit—the investment in common issues.317 Both (1) the 
problem of insufficient incentives in small-claims litigation and (2) the 
class action trust solution presume a model of rational litigant behavior. A 
plaintiff will only sue if her expected recovery is greater than the costs of 
litigation,318 and the small-claims litigation costs are only lowered by 
sharing costs and utilizing economies of scale.  
This model of litigant behavior, however, also suggests an inherent 
divergence between the interests of any one party and the interests of 
others affected by the litigation. This is because the model only considers 
the costs and benefits of the lawsuit to the plaintiff alone without taking 
into account the costs and benefits to others.319 Most obviously, the 
plaintiff in small claims litigation does not consider how the plaintiff’s 
individual action will benefit others. One benefit of the class action is that 
it forces the plaintiff to consider the interests of the other plaintiffs.  
                                                                                                                     
 316. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 
553 (1996) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). 
 317. See supra Section I.B. 
 318. Put more formally, the model assumes that the plaintiff seeks to maximize her payoff 
based on three factors: (1) the damages recoverable (L); (2) the probability of L occurring (P); and 
(3) the costs of the litigation process itself (C). Thus, the plaintiff seeks to maximize (P x L) - C. See 
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 389–418 (2004) (examining the 
basic theory of litigation); see also BONE, supra note 88, at 34 (same). 
 319. Shavell, supra note 36, at 339 (noting this divergence). Professor Shavell, in particular, 
noted (1) the costs to the defendant and (2) the costs to the public in the form of court and 
administrative expenditures. Id. 
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More importantly, and more relevant to the issue of constitutional 
litigation, the small claims plaintiff does not take into account the benefit 
of the lawsuit on future plaintiffs and defendants. In the absence of the 
class action, each plaintiff chooses not to file a lawsuit, which effectively 
allows a defendant to escape liability for any unlawful conduct that injures 
a large number of dispersed individuals. Thus, the decision not to file 
nullifies the enforcement function of the litigation, which adversely affects 
others who will suffer similar injuries in the future. In fact, some scholars 
have stressed that the primary function of the class action is precisely to 
deter such conduct, even when the benefits of the litigation to the class 
members would be miniscule.320 
The divergence between the private interests of the parties and the 
societal interest in litigation is reinforced by the concrete and 
individualized injury requirement. Far from ensuring adequacy of 
representation, limiting standing to only those individuals with a concrete 
and individualized injury inherently ensures that the social interest in the 
litigation will be subordinated to the personal interests of the parties with 
standing.  
This is particularly true in litigation involving issues of constitutional 
law. As in small-claims litigation, the joint benefits created by the 
litigation of constitutional issues are widespread, while the parties 
permitted to litigate those issues are, under the law of justiciability, 
required to differ dramatically from persons with only an 
“undifferentiated” interest in those issues “common to all members of the 
public.”321 Most obviously, the development of facts and law in any 
constitutional case most likely benefits from the same economies of scale 
as the development of common issues in small-claims litigation. But the 
current law of justiciability does not take into account the benefits of 
economies of scale in determining which party should have standing to 
sue. 
Despite the inherent divergence in the private and social interest in 
litigation created by the concrete and individualized injury requirement, 
some argue that the requirement is beneficial, and arguably harmless, for 
two reasons. First, parties may voluntarily aggregate to assist in the 
development of constitutional issues. Indeed, Rule 24 permits intervention 
as of right to individuals who would be “as a practical matter impair[ed] or 
impede[d]” by the action.322 Likewise, the filing of amicus briefs in 
                                                                                                                     
 320. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 92, at 2057–63 (arguing that the entire recovery in a 
small-claims class action should go to the attorney, since it would maximize deterrence); Myriam 
Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of 
Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 103–08 (2006) (arguing that the compensation 
function of the small-claims class action is irrelevant). 
 321. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992). 
 322. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). 
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constitutional litigation is widespread and arguably an effective way for 
nonparties to protect their rights.323 Second, the use of plaintiffs with 
concrete and individualized injuries may be harmless. Nonparties may 
work together in the background to develop the case while using the named 
plaintiff as a vivid example of the impact of the law being challenged.324 
Both reasons, however, assume the best without accounting for the 
worst. As to the first reason, admittedly, and as suggested by the Coase 
Theorem, private ordering may attain the best possible allocation of legal 
entitlements, including the right to bring a lawsuit.325 But Coasean 
invariance only obtains in the absence of transaction costs, and the small-
claims context is the classic example of transaction costs frustrating 
socially desirable litigation. It is unclear whether a federal court can 
assume that transaction costs will be sufficiently low to allow sufficient 
voluntary aggregation in constitutional issues, especially when the effect of 
the decision is even more widespread than in any small-claims case. 
As to the second reason, using plaintiffs with concrete and 
individualized injuries may result in worse decisions. Particularly with 
respect to interpretations of constitutional law, a federal court has to 
consider the aggregate effect of choosing an interpretation that will affect 
numerous present and future persons.326 A particularly vivid plaintiff may 
bias an interpretation of the Constitution that is not socially appropriate 
and effectively cause the Court to commit fallacies of composition.327 
Accordingly, federal courts should not presume that a plaintiff with a 
concrete and individualized injury would be an adequate representative of 
all of the interests bound up in constitutional litigation (or any litigation). 
Federal courts should instead look more specifically at (1) the incentives 
various parties have to litigate a case, and then determine whether (2) these 
incentives are sufficient, or otherwise should be altered, to ensure the 
adequate representation of all the persons affected by the action. In contrast 
to the current concrete and particularized injury requirement, this actual 
                                                                                                                     
 323. See Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related 
Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665, 691–93 (2012) (discussing use of amici to defend positions in 
Supreme Court litigation). 
 324. See Lea Brilmayer, A Reply, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1727, 1729 (1980) (arguing that even 
institutional plaintiffs would choose plaintiffs with concrete and individualized injuries simply as a 
matter of “wise litigation practice”); cf. Campos, Proof, supra note 25, at 766–77 (noting that the 
trust function of the class action allows for the plaintiffs themselves to bring suit individually 
because the class attorney can invest in common issues in the background). 
 325. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2–15 (1960) (discussing 
what would become the Coase theorem). 
 326. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on 
the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 45 (1984) (“Among the vices of standing analysis 
is that it allows no opportunity to assess the interests served by adjudicating a dispute.”). 
 327. See Suja A. Thomas, How Atypical, Hard Cases Make Bad Law (See, e.g., The Lack of 
Judicial Restraint in Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Ricci), 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 989 (2013) (noting 
how atypical cases may prevent courts from choosing the socially desirable decision). 
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incentives approach would require a federal court to more explicitly 
identify the incentives the parties have to litigate the action. It would also 
be sensitive to whether those incentives would affect the interests of 
persons not before the court. In other words, it is not enough that a party 
has some motivation to litigate the case. A federal court must also pay 
attention to the balance of incentives among all of the potential parties, 
including those who are uninjured. 
For example, in the small-claims context, the plaintiffs’ insufficient 
incentives are problematic because the small claims defendant does not 
suffer from similar deficient incentives. Because issues of liability 
common to the numerous plaintiffs only apply to the defendant, the 
defendant can exploit economies of scale to invest in these issues in a way 
that the plaintiffs cannot in the absence of a class action.328 Thus, these 
asymmetric incentives to litigate are functionally equivalent to collusive 
suits that the Court has rejected for putting “the public interest . . . at 
hazard.”329  
Accordingly, the Court should be more mindful of situations where the 
incentives to litigate are similarly asymmetric, leading to biases in the 
court’s exercise of jurisdiction. This is especially true in the context of 
constitutional litigation. For example, in criminal appeals involving 
constitutional issues, a criminal defendant’s incentives to appeal do not 
take into account the interests of other present and future criminal 
defendants affected by the court’s resolution of the constitutional issue. 
The criminal defendant simply wants to avoid incarceration, and thus will 
present any constitutional argument, however weak, that will increase her 
chances of avoiding prison. 
In contrast, the prosecution will be represented by the U.S. Attorneys’ 
Office, which can coordinate with the Department of Justice in 
determining how to develop their positions in any appeal. Both have an 
incentive to consider the wide-ranging effect of any criminal appeal. Thus, 
unlike the criminal defendant, the prosecution can avoid making weak 
constitutional arguments that prejudice them in later litigation. In fact, if 
the criminal defendant cannot afford an attorney and obtains an inadequate 
public defender, then the criminal defendant may cause an appeals court to 
create precedent that adversely impacts other criminal defendants. 
One possible solution suggested by the trust view of the class action is 
to permit the federal public defenders’ office to intervene as of right in all 
criminal appeals involving constitutional issues. A federal court could 
consider the public defenders’ office a trustee of the claims of all criminal 
defendants, and thus grant the office standing to protect the interests of the 
                                                                                                                     
 328. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 25, at 1075–76; Rosenberg, supra note 77, at 399–400 
(discussing asymmetric stakes in mass torts). 
 329. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (concluding that a party paid to 
appear by the opposing party did not have standing to sue). 
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population of criminal defendants affected by the appeal. Moreover, an 
appeals court can further incentivize the parties, including the federal 
public defender’s office, to represent the interests of nonparties by 
allocating costs to the public defender and the defendant’s attorney should 
they prevail.330 Finally, an appeals court may consider reducing the 
precedential effect of decisions on criminal appeals when it concludes that 
the interests of other criminal defendants were not adequately 
represented.331 Reducing the precedential effect of a decision would narrow 
the impact of that decision to the parties before the court. 
C.  Separation of Powers 
As noted above, the Court has emphasized in its recent decisions that 
the justiciability requirements of Article III, particularly the requirement of 
standing, “is built on separation-of-powers principles,” and “serves to 
prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the 
political branches.”332 The Court has stressed the importance of the 
justiciability requirements in preventing persons with “generalized 
grievances” from undermining the Executive Branch’s discretion to 
enforce federal laws under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.333 
Like the concrete and particularized injury requirement, this separation 
of powers concern is subject to a number of criticisms. Although the 
Executive Branch has discretion to exercise its law enforcement powers, 
“the Take Care Clause [also] confers a duty insofar as it imposes on the 
President both a responsibility to be faithful to law and an obligation to 
enforce the law as it has been enacted, rather than as he would have wished 
it to be.”334 This point is often missed by those, such as Justice Antonin 
Scalia, who point out that the people, acting through their elected 
representative in the President, can decide the level of enforcement.335 
                                                                                                                     
 330. But see FED. R. APP. P. 39(b) (permitting an appeals court to assess costs against the 
United States “only if authorized by the law”). 
 331. Many circuits, including the Second and Ninth Circuits, have internal rules governing the 
precedential value of its decisions. To a certain extent, many appeals courts, such as the First 
Circuit, also reduce the externalities created by an appellate decision by limiting oral argument to 
those cases where the issues will be adequately presented by the parties, with the presumption that 
only those decisions that arise from oral argument can be authored non-“per curiam” opinions with 
precedential value. Ironically, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure only permit an appellate 
court to deny oral argument if “the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs 
and record, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.” FED. R. 
APP. P. 34 (a)(2)(C). 
 332. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013). 
 333. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 761 (1984) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3). 
 334. See Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits,”Injuries,” and 
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 212 (1992). 
 335. See Scalia, supra note 304, at 897 (noting that “[w]here no peculiar harm to particular 
individuals or minorities is in question, lots of once-heralded programs ought to get lost or 
misdirected, in vast hallways or elsewhere”). 
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While true, the people, acting through the President, cannot ignore the law 
entirely.336 This is especially true of the provisions of the Constitution, 
which, “by virtue of their inclusion in the Constitution, are aimed 
predominantly at restraining the Government as an instrument of the 
popular will.”337 Thus, as Justice Harlan concluded in Flast v. Cohen, 
“[N]on-Hohfeldian plaintiffs as such are not constitutionally excluded 
from the federal courts,” and that there may be circumstances where such 
“representatives of the public interest” are warranted.338 
Nevertheless, the separation of powers concerns of the law of 
justiciability reflect a broader concern about the appropriateness of judicial 
intervention. For example, there is a general consensus that judicial 
intervention is most appropriate when the constitutional rights of 
individuals and minorities are involved.339 In these situations, judicial 
intervention may be the only method of ensuring compliance with the 
Constitution. Moreover, in such situations, there is no concern that others 
will be adversely affected by any infringement on the power of the political 
branches because the political branches are themselves the problem.  
One logical consequence of this consensus is that, while the 
justiciability doctrines are designed to ensure “‘the proper—and properly 
limited—role of the courts in a democratic society,’”340 it does not mean 
that federal courts should unquestioningly accept the results of majoritarian 
political processes. Judicial intervention may be necessary if the branches 
do not adequately represent the interests of the citizens they govern. For 
example, protecting minorities’ rights is a context where judicial 
intervention is justified to override the actions of the political branches 
because the branches cannot adequately represent those minorities’ 
interests. 
Conversely, judicial intervention is not necessary when political 
branches do adequately represent the interests of all U.S. citizens. In fact, 
judicial intervention may be harmful, as it may allow individuals to use 
federal courts to get preferred outcomes to the detriment of others. The 
                                                                                                                     
 336. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (“To 
contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a 
power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the [C]onstitution, and entirely 
inadmissible.”). 
 337. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
404 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 338. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Scripps-
Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 14 (1942)). 
 339. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
102–03 (1980) (defending an “antitrust” conception of judicial review that permits judicial 
intervention when political “markets” malfunction); Scalia, supra note 304, at 895–97; cf. United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 340. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 
U.S. 737, 750 (1984)); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
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Supreme Court made this point in a slightly different context in Diamond 
v. Charles, which, as noted earlier, concerned a challenge to an Illinois 
state law that restricted abortion.341 There, a district court struck down the 
law, but the state declined to appeal. Instead, a conscientious objector who 
lacked any injury in fact of his own sought to appeal and assert the interests 
of the state, among others.342 The Court concluded that the objector could 
not assert the interests of the state when it had declined to appeal because 
allowing the objector to appeal would permit him “to compel the State to 
enact a code in accord with Diamond’s interests.”343 The objector’s appeal 
would undermine the state’s interests and the interests of the Illinois 
citizens whom the state represented. Furthermore, the Court provided no 
indication that the State failed to adequately represent its citizens. 
Accordingly, underlying the separation of powers concerns of the law 
of justiciability is a deep due process concern with ensuring that the 
various branches, including the Judiciary itself, appropriately protect the 
legal entitlements of the citizens they govern.344 As demonstrated by 
Diamond v. Charles, this concern with ensuring that all governmental 
entities adequately represent the interests of those they govern also extends 
to state governmental entities. 
These concerns with the adequacy of representation provided by 
governmental institutions, including the judiciary, are clearly illustrated in 
the recent litigation concerning the constitutionality of Proposition 8345 and 
the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),346 which the Court 
addressed last term.347 For both cases, the due process concern with 
adequacy of representation that lies at the heart of the law of justiciability 
provides a metric for evaluating the Court’s decisions. The trust view of 
the class action also helps to illuminate which approaches taken by the 
Justices best accord with the representational function of the law of 
justiciability. 
In the Proposition 8 litigation, Hollingsworth v. Perry, the plaintiffs 
challenged the constitutionality of an amendment to the California state 
constitution, Proposition 8, that prohibited the state to recognize marriages 
                                                                                                                     
 341. 476 U.S. 54 (1986). 
 342. Id. at 61. 
 343. Id. at 65. 
 344. See generally Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation 
of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012) (arguing that the Court historically analyzed separation of 
powers concerns under the Due Process Clause). 
 345. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5. The provision was passed by “voter-enacted amendment” in 
November 2008. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013). 
 346. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2011) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2011)). 
 347. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013); United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675 (2013). 
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between same-sex individuals.348 The plaintiffs were “two same-sex 
couples who wish[ed] to marry.”349 In the DOMA litigation, United States 
v. Windsor, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of DOMA, which 
only allows the federal government to recognize marriages between “one 
man and one woman.”350 The plaintiff, Edith Windsor, who was married to 
Thea Spyer, sued because DOMA prevented Windsor from claiming an 
“exemption from the federal estate tax” that only applied to “spouses.”351 
Windsor sought to recover $363,053 in estate taxes she paid because she 
did not qualify for the exemption.352  
The plaintiffs prevailed in both suits, but the government defendants 
declined to appeal. In Perry, all state defendants declined to defend the 
constitutionality of Proposition 8 from the outset.353 In Windsor, the 
Obama Administration initially defended the constitutionality of DOMA, 
but later declined to do so.354 In addition, the defendants in both cases 
continued to enforce the challenged laws.355 In Windsor, in particular, the 
U.S. government refused to provide a refund to Windsor despite agreeing 
with the district court’s judgment.356 
Consequently, in both cases nonparties to the case sought to intervene 
in the litigation to appeal the judgments of the trial court. In Perry, 
Proposition 8 was passed not as legislation introduced in the state 
legislature, but through a statewide referendum.357 Accordingly, the 
supporters that proposed Proposition 8 and worked to get it passed sought 
to intervene and appeal.358 In Windsor, Congress passed DOMA and 
                                                                                                                     
 348. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2660; see also CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (providing that “only 
marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California”). 
 349. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2660. 
 350. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (quoting 1 U.S.C. § 7). 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. at 2683 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a)); see also 1 U.S.C. § 7 (providing that “the word 
‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the 
word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife”). 
 353. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2660 (noting that the defendants “refused to defend the law”). 
 354. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683 (“While the tax refund suit was pending, the Attorney 
General of the United States notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 530D, that the Department of Justice would no longer defend the constitutionality of 
DOMA . . . .”); see also Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen. of the U.S., to John Boehner, 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Reps. (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html (stating that “the President has 
instructed the Department not to defend the statute”). 
 355. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2660; Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684. 
 356. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684 (noting that “[t]he United States has not complied with the 
judgment”). 
 357. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2659. 
 358. Perry v. Schwarznegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010), vacated, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (referring to supporters as the “official proponents 
of Proposition 8”). 
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President Clinton signed it into law in 1996.359 However, in 2012, when 
President Obama declined to defend the statute, the Democratic Party had 
since become an opponent of the law. Currently, only the House of 
Representatives has a Republican majority, and it is this majority who 
sought to defend the statute through the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group 
(BLAG), a group consisting of five House members who advise the House 
as a whole on legal issues.360  
In both situations the proposed defendants prima facie lacked standing 
to sue under current Article III precedent. Unlike the plaintiffs in both 
cases, who were denied governmental benefits because their same-sex 
marriages was not recognized pursuant to the laws being challenged, the 
proposed defendants only alleged a diffuse interest in maintaining the 
constitutionality of the law.361 Thus, the proposed defendants seemed to 
lack the “concrete and particularized” injury necessary to establish Article 
III standing.362 
The problem of defendant standing in both Perry and Windsor is a 
recurring problem that arises when a statute burdens (or benefits) a small 
group of individuals concretely, but benefits (or burdens) a large group of 
individuals diffusely.363 Such cases can be understood as the inverse of 
protecting minority rights through judicial intervention. As noted above, 
judicial intervention may be necessary when the majority subordinates a 
minority because political alternatives for the minority to protect its 
interests are not viable. In contrast, judicial intervention in cases such as 
Perry and Windsor may allow a minority to subordinate a majority by 
                                                                                                                     
 359. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
 360. See Matthew I. Hall, How Congress Could Defend DOMA in Court (and Why the BLAG 
Cannot), 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 92, 93 (2013), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/ 
files/online/articles/Hall_65_SLRO_92_-_BLAG.pdf (discussing intervention of BLAG). 
 361. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1015 (Cal. 2011) (“[T]he parties disagree as to whether 
an official initiative proponent possesses a special or distinct interest in the validity of an initiative 
measure the proponent has sponsored once the initiative has been approved by the voters and 
adopted as state law, and, even if so, whether the nature of that interest and of the injury the 
proponent would suffer if the initiative measure is invalidated are sufficient to accord the proponent 
standing for federal law purposes under the particularized interest standard.”); Brief for Court-
Appointed Amica Curiae Addressing Jurisdiction, United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307 (Jan. 24, 
2013), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/DOMA-amicus-
standing-brief-1-24-12.pdf (“Yet BLAG asserts only a generalized interest in seeing statutes that 
Congress enacted implemented, an interest that is widely shared by the people at large. BLAG 
asserts no judicially cognizable, concrete injury to itself, to the House of Representatives or to 
Congress.”). 
 362. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 & n.1 (1992). 
 363. See Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1552 (2012) (discussing problem); Abner S. Greene, Interpretive 
Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the Enforce-But-Not-Defend Problem, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 597 (2012) (discussing problem in context of Windsor litigation). 
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getting the courts to strike down statutes as unconstitutional without a 
vigorous defense from the majority. 
1.  United States v. Windsor 
The Court in Windsor wrestled with these concerns, but, save for 
Justice Samuel Alito, did so in a somewhat confused manner. A majority 
of the Court concluded that the case was justiciable even though the 
President agreed with Windsor’s position.364 As an initial matter, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy, writing for the majority, highlighted that the U.S. 
government refused to refund Windsor her estate tax payment, and thus 
Windsor satisfied the basic requirements of standing: she suffered a 
personal injury caused by the alleged unlawful action that was 
redressable.365 Likewise, the United States was equally injured because the 
district court judgment was compelled to refund the payment, something it 
did not want to do despite agreeing with the district court on the merits.366  
The majority then considered the lack of adverseness between the 
United States and Windsor a “prudential” concern that weighed against 
justiciability, but nevertheless concluded that “countervailing 
considerations . . . outweigh the concerns underlying the usual reluctance 
to exert judicial power.”367 First, the Court noted that one consideration is 
“the extent to which adversarial presentation of the issues is assured by the 
participation of amicus curiae prepared to defend with vigor the 
constitutionality of the legislative act.”368 Here the Court noted that BLAG, 
which it considered an amicus, provided a “sharp adversarial presentation 
of the issues” sufficient to “satisfy[y] the prudential concerns that 
otherwise might counsel against hearing [the] appeal.”369  
Second, and more importantly, the majority stressed a clear adequacy of 
representation concern that weighed in favor of deciding the case. The 
Court noted that failing to address the constitutionality of DOMA would 
fail to provide “precedential guidance” for federal courts.370 Accordingly, 
“[r]ights and privileges of hundreds of thousands of persons would be 
adversely affected” until a proper case reached the Court.371 In fact, the 
Court stressed such a case may take “years” to reach the Court.372 
In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and 
Justice Clarence Thomas, disagreed that the case was justiciable, mocking 
                                                                                                                     
 364. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2688 (2013). 
 365. Id. at 2686. 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. at 2687 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–01 (1975)). 
 368. Id. 
 369. Id. at 2688. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
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the Court’s determination that adverseness is merely a prudential 
concern.373 But Justice Scalia also considered the issue of justiciability an 
issue of adequacy of representation. Specifically, Justice Scalia noted that 
the Court’s conclusion that it can sidestep adversity and address the 
constitutional issues almost sua sponte is “an assertion of judicial 
supremacy over the people’s Representatives in Congress and the 
Executive.”374 More importantly, Justice Scalia quoted from an older 
decision by Judge Roger Taney that clarified why adverse parties should be 
required—the interests of third parties “would be seriously affected if the 
question of law was decided in the manner that both parties to this suit 
desire it to be.”375 Thus, like the majority, Justice Scalia’s position was 
informed by a concern with adequacy of representation of the rights of 
others not before the Court. 
As it turns out, Justice Alito, writing separately, provided the most 
sensible position on the justiciability of Windsor. In his view, the case was 
justiciable because BLAG had sufficient standing to appeal.376 He noted 
that the House of Representatives, who BLAG represented in the litigation, 
was injured because the district court’s invalidation of DOMA impaired its 
power to legislate.377 In fact, he noted that the striking down of the statute, 
combined with the executive’s failure to defend, effectively nullified the 
House’s power to prevent repeal.378  
Accordingly, and following a suggestion from a prior case, Justice Alito 
concluded that “‘Congress is the proper party to defend the validity of a 
statute’ when the Executive refuses to do so on constitutional grounds.”379 
Indeed, current law provides some support for Justice Alito’s position. 
Although current law assigns the Department of Justice the right to defend 
the constitutionality of a federal statute, Congress (and, arguably, a subpart 
of it) can defend a statute if it expressly provides for that possibility 
through statute.380 
Although Justice Alito did not explicitly defend his position in terms of 
adequacy of representation, his position actually represented an 
improvement over those taken by the majority and Justice Scalia’s dissent. 
                                                                                                                     
 373. Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 374. Id. at 2698. 
 375. Id. at 2703 (quoting Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251, 255 (1850)). 
 376. Id. at 2712 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 377. Id. at 2713–14. 
 378. Id. at 2713 (noting that “indeed, the House’s vote would have been sufficient to prevent 
DOMA’s repeal if the Court had not chosen to execute that repeal judicially”). 
 379. Id. at 2714 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940 (1983)). 
 380. See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2012) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of 
litigation in which the United States . . . is a party, or is interested . . . is reserved to officers of the 
Department of Justice” (emphasis added)); see also Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign 
Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51, 56 n.8 (D.D.C. 1973) (holding that a resolution by one of the 
Houses is insufficient to satisfy the statute). 
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First, it took into account the majority’s concern with vigorous advocacy 
and the adequacy of representation of third-party interests without 
jettisoning the traditional requirement of adversity. The majority’s position 
required the Court in Windsor to determine whether amici could provide 
sufficiently vigorous advocacy, and whether judicial intervention by the 
Court should occur now rather than later. In contrast, Justice Alito’s 
position identified a party who intrinsically had an incentive to protect its 
own power: The House of Representative’s authorized representative. 
Moreover, that party was, or could be, available to defend at any time, thus 
obviating the need to wait for an appropriate defendant. 
Justice Alito’s position was also an improvement over Justice Scalia’s 
position in dissent. In Justice Scalia’s view, the case was not justiciable 
because it represented “political arm wrestling” between the President and 
Congress that was best done through direct confrontation, not by resort to 
the Court.381 But two aspects of this case showed the inappropriateness of 
abstention by the Court. First, the principle issue was the constitutionality 
of DOMA, and whether the statute complied with the Constitution did not 
depend on what could be horse-traded between the President and 
Congress.382 Second, and more importantly, this case did not represent a 
clash between the President and Congress, but between the President and 
only one house of Congress, with the other house, the Senate, controlled by 
the same party as the President. Had the Democratic Party achieved control 
of both houses, Congress and the President could formally repeal the 
statute, or simply not enforce it. However, the choice of nonenforcement 
by the President would effectively destroy the power of the House and the 
requirement of bicameralism contained in the Constitution.383 It would 
allow the President to effectively repeal the statute without the consent of 
the House. This quintessential separation of powers concern thus supported 
the standing of BLAG in this case. 
But this separation of powers concern was also, at bottom, a due 
process concern. Presumably, again, the procedures contained in the 
Constitution are designed to adequately protect the interests of all. By 
finding that the case was justiciable, the Court prevented the President 
from circumventing bicameralism to the detriment of parties not before the 
Court. 
2.  Hollingsworth v. Perry 
Perry similarly concerns the issue of whether a nonparty can defend a 
statute on appeal when a governmental entity refuses to defend. However, 
                                                                                                                     
 381. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 382. Id. at 2704–05 (noting that Congress can get the Executive to comply with the law by 
“refusing to confirm Presidential appointees to the elimination of funding”). 
 383. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946, 948–49 (1983) (holding that a statute can only be 
passed if it satisfies “bicameralism” and “presentment” to the President). 
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Perry materially differs from Windsor in one important respect. Unlike in 
Windsor, supporters of Proposition 8 did not initially pass the proposition 
through the ordinary procedures for state legislation. Instead, the 
supporters enacted Proposition 8 through a voter-initiated referendum that 
bypassed both the state legislature and the governor altogether. Thus, in 
Perry, and unlike in Windsor, there was not a political branch, or a subpart 
like the House of Representatives, that could adequately represent the 
interests of the supporters. 
Because of this difference, the California Supreme Court has supported 
the standing of supporters of voter-initiated provisions like Proposition 8 to 
defend such provisions when the state government has declined to do so. In 
Perry, the Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court the issue 
of whether the supporters of Proposition 8 had standing to sue under 
California law.384 The California Supreme Court concluded that the 
supporters did have standing, and noted that it has consistently allowed 
supporters of voter-initiated enactments to defend. The California Supreme 
Court noted, in particular, that 
because the initiative process is specifically intended to 
enable the people to amend the state Constitution or to enact 
statutes when current government officials have declined to 
adopt (and often have publicly opposed) the measure in 
question, the voters who have successfully adopted an 
initiative measure may reasonably harbor a legitimate 
concern that the public officials who ordinarily defend a 
challenged state law in court may not, in the case of an 
initiative measure, always undertake such a defense with 
vigor or with the objectives and interests of those voters 
paramount in mind. As a consequence, California courts have 
routinely permitted the official proponents of an initiative to 
intervene or appear as real parties in interest to defend a 
challenged voter-approved initiative measure in order “to 
guard the people’s right to exercise initiative power”385 
Here, the California Supreme Court explicitly treated standing as an 
adequency of representation issue. Rather than search for a “concrete and 
particularized” injury for standing purposes, California law looks to 
whether the proposed party will “undertake . . . a defense with vigor or 
with the objectives and interests of those voters paramount in mind.”386 
Indeed, the California Supreme Court noted that it permits such standing 
                                                                                                                     
 384. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2011) (certifying question to California 
Supreme Court). 
 385. Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1006 (Cal. 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting Bldg. Indus. 
Ass’n v. City of Camarillo, 718 P.2d 68, 75 (Cal. 1986)). 
 386. Id. 
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“without any inquiry into or showing that the proponents’ own property, 
liberty, or other personal legally protected interests would be specially 
affected by invalidation of the measure.”387 
 The Court, however, did not follow the California Supreme Court’s 
lead. A majority concluded that the supporters did not have standing to 
defend for two reasons. First, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the 
majority, noted that the supporters lacked standing because they only 
asserted a “generalized grievance” to enforce the law.388 Second, the Court 
relied on general agency principles to conclude that the state of California 
had not explicitly authorized the supporters to represent their interests on 
appeal.389 The majority noted, among other things, that the supporters were 
not agents of the state because the state could not control the actions of the 
supporters, which is “an essential element of agency.”390 
Justice Kennedy, here writing in dissent, and joined by Justice Alito 
and Justice Sotomayor, concluded that the supporters had sufficient 
standing.391 He noted, in particular, that California law, through the 
California Supreme Court, authorized the supporters to defend.392 He also 
highlighted the supporters’ unique role in enacting Proposition 8, which 
included a substantial investment of time and resources to ensure 
passage.393 Justice Kennedy thus implied that this previous investment 
showed that the supporters would vigorously defend Proposition 8. 
More importantly, Justice Kennedy castigated the majority for using 
agency principles to determine adequacy of representation when they were 
completely inappropriate in this case. Specifically, he noted that “[t]he very 
object of the initiative system is to establish a lawmaking process that does 
not depend on state officials.”394 Thus, the state cannot be the “principal” 
in an agency relationship who controls the supporters because the point of 
the initiative process is for the supporters to “circumvent[] elected officials 
who fail or refuse to effect the public will.”395 Accordingly, the majority’s 
position prohibits “a State’s authorized representatives to defend the 
outcome of a democratic election.”396 
Justice Kennedy further noted that the majority’s position “is also in 
tension with other cases in which the Court has permitted individuals to 
assert the claims on behalf of the government or others,” citing, for 
                                                                                                                     
 387. Id. at 1005. 
 388. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013). 
 389. Id. at 2667. 
 390. Id. (quoting 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2005)). 
 391. Id. at 2668 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 392. Id. at 2669. 
 393. Id. at 2669–70. 
 394. Id. at 2670 (emphasis added). 
 395. Id. at 2671. 
 396. Id. at 2674. 
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example, qui tam cases.397 Justice Roberts, anticipating this argument, 
noted that cases like qui tam litigation have historical support.398 But 
Justice Kennedy’s positions in both Hollingsworth and Windsor represent, 
in a way, a reassertion of the functional, adequacy of representation view 
of the law of justiciability that has lost some saliency in the Court’s recent 
opinions. Indeed, the re-emergence of this functional view of the law of 
justiciability, as seen in Justice Kennedy’s invocation of qui tam cases in 
Perry, further provides implicit support for the trust view of the class 
action. Based on these very recent decisions, decided last term, the trust 
view of the class action may not be as far-fetched as it initially seems. 
The trust view of the class action also highlights the central fallacy of 
the “agency” approach taken by Justice Roberts in his majority opinion. 
The trust view of the class action demonstrates that one cannot presume 
that individuals who are initially assigned the right to bring a lawsuit are 
the best representatives of those affected. This is true even when the party 
assigned the right to appear in court has been duly elected and authorized 
by the electorate. They may be, as in the case of individuals with small 
claims, or decedents, or fraud victims in qui tam situations, incompetent to 
adequately protect their interests. They may also be, as in the case of the 
government officials in Perry, adverse to the “principals” they are 
authorized to represent.  
The clearest example of a court scrutinizing the adequacy of the parties 
before them is, ironically, the California Supreme Court. Admittedly, the 
California law on standing does not necessarily coincide with the law of 
Article III standing,399 and thus one cannot infer too much from the 
California Supreme Court’s actions about the objectives of the 
justiciability requirements of Article III. But it is telling, and somewhat 
humorous, when Justice Kennedy noted in Perry that “[t]he California 
Supreme Court’s opinion reflects a better understanding of the dynamics 
and principles of Article III than does this Court’s opinion.”400 
CONCLUSION 
This Article sought to defend a trust view of the class action and, more 
broadly, a functional view of the law of justiciability as primarily 
concerned with adequacy of representation. The arguments presented in 
this Article are far from comprehensive, particularly the arguments 
concerning the objectives of the law of justiciability under Article III. But 
                                                                                                                     
 397. Id. at 2673. 
 398. Id. at 2665. 
 399. See Matthew I. Hall, Asymmetric Jurisdiction, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1257, 1272 (2011) 
(noting that state standing law does not necessarily follow standing under Article III, which may 
raise problems). 
 400. Perry, 133 S. Ct. at 2674 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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they are at least an attempt to develop “[t]he implicit premises of article 
III . . . as a tool of constitutional jurisprudence.”401 
                                                                                                                     
 401. Brilmayer, supra note 13, at 321. 
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